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DeSimone: Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code

SECTION 547(c) (2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE:
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS EXCEPTION
WITHOUT THE 45 DAY RULE
by
DAVID

J.DESIMONE*

Bankruptcy often seems rather harsh on the creditors of a bankrupt debtor.' At best, an unsecured creditor will only receive a portion of his claim
against the debtor, and he may very well not receive anything at all.' This
harsh effect is increased by bankruptcy preference law which often requires
creditors to return pre-bankruptcy transfers received from the debtor. This is
true even if the transfers were accepted in good faith, with no intent to achieve
priority over other creditors and with no knowledge of the debtor's
insolvency.'
For the first time in history, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978' provided an explicit exception from preference treatment for certain "ordinary course
of business" transfers made during the preference period.' As originally
enacted, section 547(c) (2) allowed creditors to keep transfers that were: a) in
payment of a debt incurred in the parties' ordinary course of business; b)made
within 45 days after the debt was incurred; c) made in the ordinary course of
the parties' business; and d) made according to ordinary business terms. The
"ordinary course" exception was to protect payments on most "ordinary"
short-term credit transactions and "leave undisturbed normal financial relations" between creditors and debtors. Unfortunately, it failed to accomplish
this goal.' Forty-five days proved to be too short of a time period to insulate
*B.S. Magna Cum Laude, University of Missouri-Columbia (1982): J.D., with distinction, University of
Missouri - Kansas City (1986); Law clerk for the Hon. Elmo B. Hunter, Senior District Judge, U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Missouri.
'See. e.g.. Palmer v. Radio Corp. of America, 453 P.2d 1133, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Proceedings in
bankruptcy often generate harsh results; indeed the very nature and theory of bankruptcy contemplates injury to some claimants.").
ICf id. at 1140.
'See In re Teasley, 29 Bankr. 314, 315 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (Preference law permits the trustee to yield
awesome powers and even, "'ineffect change the rules after the game is over") A creditor's knowledge of the
debtor's insolvency and various other motive or intent elements have historically been required in order for a
preferential transfer to be avoided. See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text. The current Bankruptcy
Code contains no such requirement. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
'Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2597 (amended by Bankruptcy and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333).
'II U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982).
6Id.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 5963, 6329 (1978); S.REP.
No.989, 95th Cong. 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 5787, 5874.
'See infra notes 120-145 and accompanying text.

'H.R.
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most short-term credit transactions.9 In addition, the section was a source of
frequent litigation with much of it centering around the 45 day requirement."
Apparently because of these and other problems, Congress amended section
547(c) (2) in 1984, removing the 45 day limitation."
The 1984 change expanded the scope of 547(c) (2),12 but it will not, at least
initially, reduce the amount of litigation.' 3 This is because the remaining three
requirements are dependent upon the meaning that courts attach to the word
"ordinary," since it is not defined by the Code." Moreover, since the 45 day requirement was dispositive in most pre-amendment cases, only a small percentage of those cases discussed the three "ordinary course" requirements.' 5 Those
cases that did reach the "ordinary course requirements" seldom provided much
in-depth analysis as to their meaning and scope.
This article will look at some of the principles set forth by case law and
provide a more structured method of analyzing cases under section 547(c) (2).
In addition, it will examine a few problem areas that are certain to arise in section 547(c) (2) litigation in the near future: (1) Does section 547(c) (2) now protect principal payments on long term debt?; and, (2) will section 547(c) (2) protect a payment to one creditor when all or nearly all other creditors were not
paid during the preference period? But before doing so, a short explanation of
the Code's definition of preference and a look at the policy and history behind
both preference law and the ordinary course exception is in order.
WHAT Is A PREFERENCE?

In general, a preference is a transfer to a creditor that is recoverable by the
bankruptcy trustee 6 because the creditor "is deemed to have unduly improved
'See infra notes 137-143 and accompanying text.
'See. e.g., Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(cX2). 550(aXI), and
546(aXI), 41 Bus. LAW. 175, 177 (1985).
"Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 lcodified as
amended at I I U.S.C. § 5471c0)2) (Supp. 11 1984)).
"See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
"See Nutovic, supra note 10, at 177 n. I I ("it can be argued that elimination of the 45 day rule will not
decrease the volume of litigation over § 547(c)(2) but will merely shift the litigation focus to the remaining requirements of that subsection").
"Cf Herbert, The Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor: A Critique of Section 547(cXi). (2) & (4) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 692 (author describes the ordinary course of business and ordinary business terms requirements as "the most opaque requirements to date").
"See. e.g.. In re Brenton's Cove Dev. Co., 52 Bankr. 287, 292 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985) ("Unlike the amended
statute, former 547(c)(2) included a 45 day rule which was virtually always dispositive, because unless the
transfer occurred within 45 days after the debt was incurred, there was no need to consider whether payment was in the ordinary course of business."); Id. at 292. In re Ewald Bros., Inc., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
70,191 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) ("There has been substantial litigation concerning the section 547(c)(2) ordinary course of business exception. Much of it, however, has concentrated primarily on whether the 45 day
Few decisions have fully addressed the other elements of the exception. Conserule has been satisfied ....
quently, just what constitutes the ordinary course of the debtor's and transferee's businesses or ordinary
business terms remains somewhat unclear.").
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
"I I U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 550 (1982). The trustee's powers are vested in the debtor in possession in a chapter I I
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his position to the detriment of other creditors of the debtor's estate."17 The
Bankruptcy Code defines a preference as:
...any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;'"
(4) made (A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider;
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if -

(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title. 9
The burden of proof is on the trustee to prove the elements of a preference.20 Given the broad definition provided by the Code, almost any transfer
made within 90 days of bankruptcy to an unsecured or undersecured creditor"
on an antecedent debt is a preference. However, this potentially broad
case and the debtor in possession can bring an action to recover a preference. II U.S.C. § 1107(a). Also,
"'luinderappropriate circumstances, a creditor or a creditor's committee may bring an action in the name of
a trustee or a debtor in possession." Nutovic, supra note 19, at 176 n.8.
'"Young, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 222 (1980). "The
classic preference situation is that of a privileged creditor - perhaps an insider - with knowledge of and influence over the affairs of the debtor who, seeing that the debtor is sinking in insolvency, gets payment of his
debt before the debacle becomes manifest." R. JORDAN & W. WARREN. BANKRUPTcY 317-18 ( 19851.
"A debtor is presumed to be insolvent during the 90 days preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition. I I
U.S.C. § 547(f) 11982). See Young, supra note 17, at 222-23, for a discussion of how this presumption
operates.
" I I U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). The elements of a preference are basically the same as they were
under the old Bankruptcy Act ("1898 Act"). Levin, An Introduction to the Trustees A voiding Powers. 53
AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 183 (1979). The only major difference is that under the 1898 Act the trustee was required to prove that the debtor was insolvent on the date of the transfer and that the creditor receiving the
transfer had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. See infra note 65 and accompanying
text.
1II U.S.C. § 547(g) (Supp. 11 1984.
21
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) separates undersecured creditors' claims into two parts: a secured component and
an unsecured component. A creditor has a secured claim only to the extent of the value of his collateral. Any remaining balance is an unsecured claim. The effect of § 506(a) is to classify claims, not
creditors, as secured and unsecured. In other words, a single undersecured credit has both a secured
ciaim and an unsecured claim. .... "
Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted). Any payment on an
unsecured debt, up to the amount it is unsecured, is potentially a preference. Id. at 508. Payments on fully
secured debt are not subject to preference treatment because they do not enable the creditor to receive more
than he would in a chapter 7 case. See I I U.S.C. § 547(b)(5).
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avoidance power is substantially tapered by the exceptions in section 547(c).22
POLICY

Probably the most fundamental concept underlying the entire field of
bankruptcy is equality of distribution of the debtor's assets among his
creditors.23 "This goal cannot be achieved if a debtor is free to prefer favorite
creditors by distributing assets unequally shortly before commencing a bankruptcy case."2 ' If such conduct is allowed, bankruptcy distributions would
become largely meaningless. Therefore, it is not surprising that "equality of
treatment of creditors is the oldest and most frequently advanced goal of
preference law." 26 Congress stated that this was one of the two primary goals
behind section 547 when it was enacted in 1978.27
The other primary goal recognized by Congress was that preference law
should discourage creditors from dismembering the debtor prior to bankruptcy.8 In the weeks and months preceding bankruptcy, creditors often sense that
financial collapse is imminent and accelerate their demands so as to collect on
their claims before bankruptcy.29 This so-called "race of diligence" is to be expected and is often a rational decision from the point of view of an individual
creditor. He knows that he will likely be paid little or nothing on his claim after
the debtor enters bankruptcy. However, such action is not desirable from the
211IU.S.C. § 5471c). There are currently seven exceptions. A creditor "is protected by each [exception] to the
extent he can qualify under each." S. REP. No.95-598, supra note 7,at 88.
2
See, e.g., Weintraub & Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts. 17 U.C.C. L.J. 263, 264 (1985).
2

Id.

So long as a debtor is solvent, every creditor can expect to be paid in full, and each may act independently without affecting others. There is generally no occasion for collective action. Once the
debtor is insolvent, however, payment of one creditor necessarily prejudices others because there are
insufficient assets to satisfy all. Bankruptcy, a collective claim enforcement proceeding, appears in the
law in response to this kind of potential prejudice. From the creditor's standpoint, bankruptcy's principal theme is equality, or ratable distribution of the debtor's assets, among unsecured creditors. Once
proceedings have been initiated, independent collection efforts are forbidden because they run
counter to that theme. Because the law leaves initiation of bankruptcy to the parties, however, there
may be an interval between the beginning of insolvency and the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. Although preference law comes into play only after bankruptcy proceedings have been instituted, its focus is on the period between the onset of insolvency and bankruptcy, and its target is a
transfer to one creditor during that period.
McCoid, Bankruptcy. Preferences. and Efficienc~v: An Expression of Doubt. 67 VA.L. REV. 249, 259-60
(1981).
2
'McCoid, supra note 24, at 260-6 1.
2,Id.

We can find this notion as far back as the 16th century Case of Bankrupts.... in which the court
stated ". . .there ought to be an equal distribution ...but if, after the debtor becomes a bankrupt, he
may prefer one ...and defeat and defraud many other poor men of their true debts it would be unequal and unconscionable, and a great defect in the law .....
R. JORDAN & W. WARREN. supra note 17, at 317.
2
H.R. REP. No.95-595, supra note 7,at 177-78. But see Herbert, supra note 14, at 966-67 (arguing that §
547 does not accomplish this goal very well).
"'H.R. RE'. No. 95-595, supra note 7,at 177. But see Herbert, supra note 14, at 696 (arguing that § 547 does
not do a very good job of accomplishing this goal either).
NNutovic, supra note 10, at 184-85.
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point of view of both the debtor's other creditors and of society as a whole.
The obvious reason for discouraging a race among creditors to collect on
their claims before bankruptcy is that doing so will help to maximize the debtor's estate which will be distributed among all creditors." This, of course, is in
the best interest of the creditor group as a whole and, to some extent, in the
best interest of society."
The less obvious, but more important reason is such action by creditors
will without a doubt hasten or even cause the debtor's slide into bankruptcy. 2
"[Clontinuation of [the debtor's] business is desirable because it may well permit the [debtor] to restructure its operations outside of bankruptcy, thereby
avoiding the cost of bankruptcy and ultimately permitting greater payment to
all creditors."" It is difficult to keep a troubled business afloat if its cash and
other assets are being transferred to certain preferred creditors. In fact, it is in
society's best interest to prevent bankruptcy in the first place.3" Many
businesses have financial troubles at one time or another, but a relatively small
percentage of them ever enter bankruptcy. If the bankruptcy laws in general,
and specifically the preference laws, did not "discourage the dismemberment of
ailing, but salvageable debtors,"35 there would be far more bankruptcies. This
would clearly not be in society's best interest.

Other possible policies underlying preference law have been proposed
from time to time. It has been stated that it is a goal of preference law to
"eliminate the incentive to make unwise loans in order to obtain a preferential
payment or security."36 One commentator wrote that Congress intended sec''McCoid, supra note 24, at 26 1. This is accomplished directly by bringing the preferential transfer back in

the estate and indirectly because the value of the estate as a going concern may be greater than the sum of its
parts. If the estate is dismantled then it would be impossible to sell it as a going concern. Id. In any event, the
trustee should have both options available to him.
"It is the best interest of society to minimize "costs" of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy "costs" are lower when
there is a relatively large distribution to creditors, in relatively equal amounts. Of course, there are costs
associated with recovering preferences, such as legal costs and the costs to a creditor who may have acted in
reliance on a payment later deemed to be a preference. These must be considered when evaluating the
marginal decrease in bankruptcy's cost to society from labeling a certain category of transactions as
preferences. But, if the preference laws are clear and both debtors and creditors take them into account
when making decisions, the cost of recovering preferences should be negligible.
"Cf H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 7, at 177.
"Herbert, supra note 14, at 670. "The House report on the 1978 Act suggests that preference law often
allows a debtor to resolve his financial troubles through cooperation with his creditors." McCoid, supra note
24, at 261 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177).
-'1tcan be perssuasively argued that this is society's most important goal with respect to bankruptcy law. But
cf. Ross, The Impact of Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code upon Secured and Unsecured Creditors, 69
MINN. L. REv. 39, 45 n. 12 (1984). Ross notes that it may be desirable in some cases to have secured creditors
"police" debtors, and "pull the plug" when things get bad. This prevents the accumulation of substantial
unsecured, and probably unpaid, debt. Stopping such accumulation of debt is no doubt desirable, but filing
an involuntary petition, rather than dismantling the debtor, is probably the best (and proper) method of
policing the debtor.
"Ross, supra note 34, at 45.
"6Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong.,
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tion 547 to allow for the redistribution of money from secured to unsecured
creditors." A group studying Canadian bankruptcy law felt that preference
law "indirectly encourages a higher level of commercial morality and a greater
confidence in the credit system."38 While these goals may have merit, Congress
did not mention them when enacting section 547, so it must be assumed that
they are, at best, secondary goals of preference law.
Besides the general preference policies discussed above, the ordinary
course exception was enacted to address additional concerns. The main policy
behind the ordinary course exception is to prevent preference laws from disturbing normal financial relations.39 This makes sense when one considers that
the purpose of preference law is to discourage unusual action on the eve of
bankruptcy that interferes with the bankruptcy distribution. '0 Ordinary course
transactions do not do this and, in fact, uphold the preference/bankruptcy
policy of avoiding bankruptcy in the first place. If preference law applied to
pre-bankruptcy ordinary course of business transactions, few creditors would
extend credit to troubled debtors; and without credit, few troubled debtors
could continue in business. Section 547(c) (2) encourages creditors to extend
credit to financially troubled debtors.' It strikes a balance between the need to
discourage unusual action and the troubled debtor's need to receive credit in
order to continue in business and, hopefully, turn his troubles around.
The next section will discuss the history of preference law in order to see
how it developed and to see how ordinary course transfers were treated under
prior law.

Ist Sess. 202 [hereinafter Commission's Reportl. The Commission was appointed by Congress to study
bankruptcy law and recommend changes to the 1898 Act. (See infra notes 92, 110-112 and accompanying
text for a further discussion of the Commission's report.) It stated that this was one of the three goals of
preference law. This concept apparently evolved from Daniel Webster's opinion "that repayments to banks
should not be protected [by bankruptcy law] as a means of discouraging dubious loans." Tait & Williams,
Bankruptcy Preference Laws: The Scope of Section 547(cX2) 99 BANKING L.J. 55, 63 n.21 (1982). Webster,
and apparently the Commission, were afraid that a creditor might make a loan to a troubled debtor that it
ordinarily would not make, if the debtor promised him a preference in the event of insolvency. This is probably no longer a fear today because a creditor will demand security, rather than a promise of preference
before giving credit. McCoid, supra note 24, at 26 1. And as a practical matter, how do you distinguish between wise and unwise loans? Id. Moreover, "in a growing economy some risk taking by lenders may be
desirable." Tait & Williams, supra, at 63 n. I. In any event, Congress did not list it as a goal of preference law
when it enacted § 547.
"Ross, supra note 34, at 41-42. Congress certainly never explicitly stated this in the legislative history of §
547, although the anticipated effect of the § 547(c) exceptions may have led one to believe that this was an
underlying purpose. In any event, § 547 is probably not meeting this purpose, especially since the 1984
amendment to § 547(c)(2). See Ross, supra note 34, at 55-56, 67.
'8Commission 's Report, supra note 36, at 202.
"9See, e.g.. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 7, at 373.
4OSee. e.g., Nutovic, supra note 10, at 186.
"See, e.g., In re Morris, 53 Bankr. 190, 192 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985). It may be more correct to say that 547(c)(2)
does not discourage creditors from extending credit to troubled debtors.
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Early English bankruptcy law considered bankrupts to be fraudulent.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the emergence of preference law in England
was tied to the concept of fraud." By the mid- 1500's it was a crime for a debtor
to preferentially transfer property before committing an act of bankruptcy."
However, preferences were originally treated as public rather than private
wrongs and remained so until the mid-1700's.46
It was not until 1768, in Alderson v. Temple, 7 that property preferentially
transferred became subject to recapture. 8 In that case, the first judicial definition of a preference was established: (1)there had to be an "intent to prefer on
the part of the debtor"; and (2) the transfer had to result in a "wrong" to the
other creditors. 9 It is interesting that a transfer was not considered preferential
if the creditor sued the debtor first, or demanded that the debt be repaid or
even if he threatened the debtor, as long as the threat was without fraud."0 In
1883, the definition was refined: all payments made with a view towards giving
one creditor an advantage over others were preferences." This is basically still
the law today in England, with the focus being on the intent of the debtor in
making the transfer. 2
"The first American bankruptcy legislation, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,
neither defined nor prohibited preferences. Preferences were sometimes recaptured, however, on principles drawn from the English decisions.15 3 The 1841
Bankruptcy Act defined an avoidable preference as, inter alia, transactions "in
contemplation of bankruptcy . . . for the purpose of giving any creditor...
priority over the general creditors of such bankrupts""4 While this definition is
HISTORY OF PREFERENCE LAW BEFORE

41Several good sources are available which provide a more thorough examination of early English and American preference law. See 3

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

160.02, 60.04 (14th ed. 1977) thereinafter COLLIERI;

McCoid, supra note 24, at 251-59; Morris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating
Liens, 54 MINN. L. REV. 737 (1970); In re Hall, 4 AM. BANKR. REP. 671, 679-81 (W.D.N.Y. 1900).
, 3McCoid, supra note 24, at 250.
"Id. "Such preference would be a Fraud upon the whole bankrupt laws, and defeat the two main ends of
them: ... the management ... of the bankrupt's estate land] lain equal distribution amongst his creditors."
Worseley v. Demathos, 96 Eng. Rep. 1160, 1161 (K.B. 1758) (quoted in McCoid, supra note 24, at 252).
'COLLIER at 60.04; McCoid, supra note 24, at 251. The debtor faced imprisonment, two hours in the
pillory and loss of an ear. See COLLIER at 60.04.
" McCoid, supra note 24, at 251.
'96 Eng. Rep. 384 (K.B. 1768).
"McCoid, supra note 24, at 251.
"See COLLIER at

1 60.04.

"OMcCoid, supra note 24, at 252.
60.04.
"COLLIER at
121d.; McCoid, supra note 24, at 252. Likewise, transfers which would otherwise be preferences are still exempted as long as they were induced by the creditor. See COLLIER at 1 60.04.
"McCoid, supra note 24, at 253 (footnotes omitted).
-'Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, §2, 5Stat. 440 (repealed 1843), see also McCoid, supra note 24, at 253. The
Act also provided that a debtor who granted such a preference could not receive a discharge. Id.
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similar to the English definition, there were some differences in the way the
statute was applied. First, the courts presumed that a transfer made by a debtor who knew he was insolvent was made in contemplation of bankruptcy."
Therefore, it was the effect of the transfer rather than the debtor's motive in
making the transfer that was important. 6 Second, an otherwise preferential
transfer could not be "saved" just because it was demanded by the creditor. 7
Nonetheless, as in England, the focus was still on the debtor, and not on the
creditor's knowledge or motive.5
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was the first to require any sort of intent or
knowledge on the part of the creditor. It required that the creditor have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent or in contemplation of
insolvency and that the transfer was made in fraud of the bankruptcy laws.59
And, like the 1841 Act, it required that the debtor be "insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency" and that the transfer be intended by the debtor to
give preference to a creditor." Also, for the first time, the Act limited preference to those transfers made within the four months preceding bankruptcy.6'
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 made a somewhat significant change in
preference law by eliminating the requirement that the debtor have an intent
to give a preference.62 This remains true today. 3 But, the 1898 Act kept the
preference period at four months,' and it still required that the debtor be insolvent when the transfer was made and that the creditor have "reasonable cause
to believe that [the transfer was intended].., to give a preference. '65 This latter
requirement was changed in 1910 to "reasonable cause to believe that the...
transfer would effect a preference." And finally, in 1938, it was changed to
"reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 67
Since the bulk of American preference law cases prior to 1978 arose under
5

See McCoid, supra note 24, at 254-55 and cases discussed therein. Cf.COLLIER at

60.02.

"Cf. McCoid, supra note 24, at 253-54.
"Id.
at 254.
"The 1841 Act did exempt good faith payments made more than two months before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. Id. at 257, 259.
"Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
11ld. As with the previous Act, the courts "held that a debtor who was aware of his insolvency and who
made a transfer to a creditor, did so with a view towards giving a preference." McCoid, supra note 24, at
256.
"Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
"Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
6""Generally speaking it is the effect of the transfer rather than the debtors intent, that is controlling." COLLIER

at 1 60.02.

"Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
11d. at 563.
"Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § I1,36 Stat. 838.
"Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 60(b), 52 Stat. 840. COLLIER states that the only situation where this
change would make any difference would be when a creditor knew that the debtor was insolvent, but felt
that he would turn his troubles around. COLLIER at 60.5211.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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the 1898 Act, 68 it will be helpful to briefly review how its preference provision
operated in practice. This will provide some insight into the reasons behind the
major change in preference law in 1978, and show how ordinary course of
business-type transactions were treated before section 547(c) (2) was adopted.
Under the 1898 Act, basic elements of a preference were the same as they
are today, with two important exceptions.69 First, the trustee was required to
prove that the debtor was insolvent at the time the transfer was made. 70 This
was often difficult for the trustee to prove. 7' The second difference was that, as
previously mentioned, the trustee had to prove that the creditor had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent when the transfer
was significantwas made.72 The trustees' power to avoid preferential transfers
73
ly diminished by having to prove these two elements.
There were few clear cut rules for deciding when a creditor had reasonable cause to believe; 7' and "to a great extent each case [was] decided on its
own facts.1 7 The creditor had to have reasonable cause to believe at the time
the transfer was made.76 But, he did not have to have actual knowledge that
the debtor was insolvent.77 A creditor was charged with reasonable cause to
believe "when the facts known to him would [have led] 7a8 prudent business person to the conclusion that the debtor [was] insolvent.
In general, a creditor was presumed to have acted in good faith in accepting payment on a debt and the burden was on the trustee to rebut this.79 The
"The main reason for this is because the prior Acts were relatively short-lived.
"Levin, supra note 19, at 183. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current
elements of a preference.
uSee II U.S.C. § 60(a) (1976). Today insolvency is presumed, II U.S.C. § 547(f) (1982), and it is up to the
creditor to rebut this presumption. See supra note 18. This is, no doubt, a difficult hurdle for a creditor to
overcome. In fact, it is probably harder for a creditor to prove the debtor was not insolvent than it was for
the trustee, under prior law, to prove that he was insolvent, since the trustee presumably has "easier" access
to the debtor's records, etc. As a practical matter, creditors will seldom try to prove that the debtor was solvent at the time of the transfer. Given the realities of most failing debtors, most are probably insolvent during the 90 day period anyway.
"Insolvency was defined as the debtor having liabilities greater than his assets, COLLIER at 960.52121, and,
therefore, was never impossible to prove. But, actually going back through a debtor's books to see if he was
insolvent on a particular date is a formidable task, especially in the case of a business debtor. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, supra note 7, at 178. As a practical matter, it was often not worth the trustees' effort to try
60.30-60.31 for a
and prove insolvency unless the transfer was relatively large. See generally COLLIER at
discussion of how the insolvency element operated under the 1898 Act.
7211 U.S.C. § 60(b) (1976).
71See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 7, at 178; Nutovic, supra note 10, at 178.
7Young,
supra note 17, at 222. See generally COLLIER at 1 60.52-60.56 for a more thorough discussion of
how the reasonable cause to believe requirement operated.
"COLLIER at 60.52121.
"COLLIER at 1 60.56.
7Id. at 160.53111.
78Id.
"d.
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fact that a debt was overdue, without more, was not enough." Likewise, a
mere suspicion that the debtor was insolvent or a creditor's anxiety over debts
that were not paid was insufficient.8 ' In fact, creditors often could demand and
receive additional security without being charged with reasonable cause to
believe the debtor was insolvent.82 Knowledge of insolvency was often found in
cases involving creditors with a close relationship to the debtor.83 But a family
or business relationship, standing by itself, was not enough."
The reasonable cause to believe requirement protected most ordinary
course of business transactions. In discussing the treatment of ordinary course
of business payments under the 1898 Act, Collier on Bankruptcy states:
Payments received by a creditor in the ordinary course of business with an
insolvent debtor are not necessarily voidable. The acceptance of payments
with no special purpose of obtaining advantage over other creditors but in
accordance with the creditor's general method of collecting outstanding
accounts will not give rise to reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is
insolvent. 5
Thus, an explicit exception from preference treatment for ordinary course of
business transfers was unnecessary under the old Act because the reasonable
cause to believe requirement insulated nearly all such transactions.86
Another method of protecting ordinary course transfers was the judicially
created "current expense rule."8 The rule allowed payments for current
operating expenses of the debtor to be exempted from preference treatment. 8
For example, payments for such things as wages, rent, advertising and warehousing expenses were exempted.89 The rationale behind the rule was that such
debts were not antecedent debts." While the current expense rule was no
doubt helpful to some creditors, the reasonable cause to believe requirement
"'Id.at 160.54111.
"Id. at
!Id.

60.53121.

"See cases discussed in (oL.LIER at
"Id.at 160.54111.
'5(O.tL-R

60.53111 n.2.

at 1 60.54141 (footnotes omitted).

"In re Brown. 20 Bankr. 554, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1982): see also Tait & Williams, supra note 36, at 57 (reasonable cause to believe "protected most payments to unsecured creditors since ... the requirement that the
trustee prove the state of mind of his opponent Iwasl nearly insurmountable").
',see Herbert, supra note 14, at 679: Barash, 658 F.2d at 510.
"Kaye. Prejerences Under the New Bankruptcy Code. 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 202 (1980): COI.LtER at
60.23 ("payments on account of current business expenses incidental to the operation of a business Iwere]
not within the category of preferential transfers"): Barash. 658 F.2d at 510-511 : In re Acme-Durham, Inc.,
50 Bankr. 734. 740 ID. me. 19851.
"See Kaye. supra note 88. at 202.
1'd. Remember, a transfer must be in payment of an antecedent debt in order to be considered a preference.
See I I U.S.C. § 5471b)(21.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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was the most important means of protecting ordinary course transfers.,'
1978 BANKRUPTCY PERFORM ACT
The move to amend the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 began in 1970 when
Congress appointed a Commission to "study, analyze, evaluate and recommend changes in the bankruptcy laws."92 By that time there was widespread
sentiment that preference law was too complex, did not conform to modern
commercial practices, produced unnecessary litigation and generally failed to
fulfill the policies it was intended to advance. 93
One of the major criticisms of the old law was the reasonable cause to
believe requirement. A recent article on the subject states:
First, it was said that reasonable cause to believe was an unnecessary
burden to impose upon the trustee in bankruptcy. Invariably, the
transferee alleged that he did not know or have reason to know that the
debtor was insolvent, thus creating a litigable issue in every case, with the
burden of proof resting on the trustee in bankruptcy.'
Rather than protecting innocent creditors, it often protected creditors who had
knowledge of the debtors insolvency, but against whom the trustee was unable
to prove such knowledge. 95 Furthermore, there seemed to be no justifiable
reason for treating a creditor who knows he's getting a windfall differently
from one who does not know but gets one anyway.' Finally, it was noted that
the reasonable cause to believe requirement "was designed to prevent the 'race
of diligence' but did not consider, and actually interfered with, equitable distri'There are two reasons for saying this. First, there are very few cases to be found that explicitly applied the
current expense rule. (This could, of course, just mean that trustees were aware of the parameters of the rule
and did not bring suit in cases that fell within it; however, this is unlikely.) Second, the very nature of the
rule (i.e., that it was based on the payments not being on antecedent debt) excludes from its coverage all but
very short-term, operating debts. Clearly, payments on long-term, but ordinary debts were usually protected
from preference treatment. See. e.g.. Barash. 658 F.2d at 510 (recognizing that the reasonable cause to
believe requirement usually protected such payments).
Several commentators and courts have stated that the current expense rule was the forerunner of §
5471c)(2). See. e.g., Kaye, supra note 88, at 201-02; Barash. 658 F.2d at 510; In re Property Leasing & Management Co., 46 Bankr. 903, 914 (E.D. Tenn. 1985). This may or may not be true. Congress never mentioned it. The rule operated in a manner that is similar to the way in which § 547(c)12) operated under the 45
day rule. However, the rationale underlying the rule is that the payment was not a payment on an antecedent debt. It is far from clear that this was ever the rationale behind § 547(c)12), given the inclusion of an explicit exception in § 547 for substantially contemporaneous transfers which protects transfers that are technically antecedent debts, I I U.S.C. § 5471c)(1), and the 1984 amendment which removed the 45 day requirement.
"Nutovic, supra note 10, at 178 n.14.
"See. e.g.. Commi&vions Report, supra note 36, at 204-05; 4 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY I 547.03121Hl5th ed.
1981); Young, supra note 17, at 221. By that time article 9 of the U.C.C. had been adopted in nearly all jurisdictions. There were major conflicts between it and § 60 with regard to creation and protection of security

interests. See, e.g., Commissions Report, supra note 36, at 204-2 10; Levin, supra note 19, at 173-74.
"Fortgang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions. 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148,
1165 (1981).
5
" COLLIER at
60.52121; Levin, supra note 19, at 184 (reasonable cause to believe meant to protect innocent
creditors, but resulted in only the most blatant preferences being avoided).
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bution among creditors."97
Given all the criticism, it is not surprising that Congress removed the
reasonable cause to believe requirement when it adopted section 547 in 1978.98
This, coupled with section 547's presumption that the debtor is insolvent during the 90 days prior to bankruptcy," left "little ... , if anything for the trustee
to prove in order to avoid [a] preference." 100 This was recognized by both the
Commission in its recommendations and by Congress in section 547.11
Therefore, for the first time in history, specific statutory exceptions were placed
into preference law. 012 The effect of the exceptions was not only to mitigate the
breadth of the statute,03 but also to ensure that preference law achieved its
04

policy goals.'

One of the exceptions was, of course, the section 547(c) (2) ordinary
course of business exception. Insulating ordinary course of business transactions made sense; otherwise, creditors would be reluctant to deal with troubled
debtors unless it was on a cash-only basis. 05 After all, it is often easy to tell
when a debtor is in financial trouble, but it is difficult to predict if and when he
may enter bankruptcy 106
Creditors may very well not extend credit to such
debtors if later repayments are subject to preference attack." 7 They "might,
however, be willing to extend.., credit if it could be assured that [they] would
at least be able to keep payments timely made."''0 Moreover, such payments do
not threaten the bankruptcy distribution scheme. 19
The genesis of 547(c) (2)was in the Commission's recommendations. Its
"Tait & Williams. supra note 36. at 58 Iciting H.R. Rti '. No.95-595, at 177-791.
"Note how, over time. "IpIreference law has moved from a notion of debtor fraud to a standard of absolute
liability for a limited period for preferred creditors." McCoid. supra note 24. at 259. See also Nutovic, supra
note 10. at 178 n.21 I"The deletion of any requirement of demonstrating creditor knowlege of insolvency is
consistent with an historical move away from a test predicated on establishing indicia of culpable intent or
bad motives."). The only intent or motive requirement that was left was for transfers to insiders between 90
days and one year before insolvency. I I U.S.C. § 547(b1141 11982). This was removed in 1984. See I I U.S.C.
§ 5471b)14)(Supp. II 1984). Thus. preference law is now essentially strict liability.
'"II U.S.C. § 547(f).
"'Fortgang & King, supra note 94, at 1166. Note that the other six preference elements are essentially the
same as they were under § 60. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
"'See Fortgang & King, supra note 94, at 1166. Nutovic, supra note 10, at 180.
": Young. supra note 17, at 225.
'"Nutovic. supra note 10, at 180.
"'See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of preference policy.
'"see Herbert, supra note 14, at 679. In re Morris, 53 Bankr. 190, 192 IBankr. D. Or. 1985) ("This court
believes that the purpose of section 547(c)12) was to encourage creditors to continue short-term credit dealings with troubled debtors in order to forestall bankruptcy rather than encourage it.").
"See Morris. 53 Bankr. at 193.
Id.
I..
Id.
"'Cf.In re Production Steel, Inc., BANKR. L. R,P. (CCHI 70,843 at 88,029 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985)
'(Congress intended § 547(c)(2) to prevent the avoidance of transfers which because of their ordinary
character, were not deemed injurious to either the debtor's rights or those of other creditors.").
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approach was to exclude certain types of transfers that, because of policy
reasons, it felt should be protected. It recommended that:
Transfers of an aggregate value of less than $1,000 to a creditor not closely related to the debtor during the three-month period are not subject to
attack. Most absolute sales and all transfers in payment of debts for personal services, debts for utilities incurred within three months of the petition, and debts for inventory paid within three months of the delivery of
the inventory in the ordinary course of debtor's business should not be
subject to preference attack.'"
The Commission also felt that transfers made on debt incurred within five days
of the transfer should not be considered as having been made on an antecedent
debt."' Obviously, the Commission's approach, while not specifically exempting ordinary course payments, protected many such payments.
"The difficulty with the Commission's proposal was that, after one waded
through all of the exceptions, the only type of transfer that could be avoided
was the payment by a debtor to an installment lender in reduction or satisfaction of aclaim for money borrowed."" ' This naturally led to cries of unfairness
from banks and other such lenders."' After hearings, Congress re-wrote the
preference section. The revision became section 547Y. While the scheme
adopted by Congress protects many of the same transactions that the Commissions report recommended protecting, its approach was different. Section
547(c) was aimed more at protecting general categories of transfers, rather
than specific types of transactions. And, unlike the Commission's report, it
provided a general exception for ordinary course of business transactions section 547(c) (2).'"
Congress only briefly discussed section 547(c) (2)in the legislative history
of the 1978 Act.
The second exception protects ordinary course of business (or financial affairs, where a business is not involved) transfers. For the case of a consumer, the paragraph uses the phrase "financial affairs" to include such
nonbusiness activities as payment of monthly utility bills.... The purpose
of this exception is to leave undisturbed normal financial relations,
because it does not detract from the general policy of the preference sec"'Commision s Report. supra note 36, at 201.
"lid. at 205.
" 2Fortgang & King, supra note 94, at 1166. This is somewhat of an overstatement, but such lenders were hit
much harder by this proposal than other creditor groups.
"'Nutovic, supra note 10, at 179; Fortgang & King, supra note 94, at 166. Note that, despite their complaints to Congress, installment lenders were not protected by § 547(c)(2) as originally enacted.
"'Fortgang & King, supra note 94, at 1166-67. After it was re-written, no hearings were held on § 547(c)(2).
Id.at 1167.
"III U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(2).
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tion to discourage unusual action by either the debtor or his creditors dur6
ing the debtor's slide into bankruptcy."
Neither the statute or the legislative history defined important terms used in
the statute, such as: "ordinary course of business," "ordinary business terms,"
and when a debt is "incurred." Commentators criticized this and predicted that
there would be much litigation regarding the meaning of the terms." 7 There
was also some criticism of the scope of the exception in that it apparently
would only protect payments on short-term debts."' Timely payments on longer term debts would almost assuredly be preferences because of the 45 day requirement." 9
PROBLEMS WITH THE

45 DAY RULE AND THE 1984 AMENDMENT

The commentators were correct; section 547(c) (2) was the source of considerable litigation, with the bulk of it centered around the 45 day rule. 2 ' In
fact, the application of the 45 day rule was the deciding factor in most cases,
with little attention given to the other three requirements. 2'
The biggest problem was determining when a debt was "incurred" for
547(c) (2) purposes. Several choices were arguably available including the contract date, the date goods were shipped or delivered, the invoice date, or the
date that the debt was due. Early on, the courts decided that a debt was incurred on the date that the debtor first became legally bound to pay. 22 This added little to the analysis, 23 but rather changed the focus to: When was a debt
"'H.R. REP. No. 95-695, supra note 7, at 373; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 7, at 88.
"'See. e.g.. Young, supra note 17, at 228-29; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.21 (15th ed. 1981); Countryman, Bankruptcy Preferences - Current Law and Proposed Changes. II U.C.C. L.J. 95, 102 (1978),
Kaye, supra note 88, at 203 (noting correctly that the biggest problem would be with when a debt was "incurred"). For example, is a debt "incurred" on the date goods are ordered, or the date they are delivered, or
on the date on which an invoice is sent? See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
"'See Tait & Williams, supra note 36, at 55 ("Depending on the interpretation of incurred, the 1978 code
could, for the first time, allow the trustee to recover timely, good faith payments made to unsecured term
creditors as preferences even when the payments are in the ordinary course of business, and made with no
knowledge and no unusual action."); Herbert, supra note 14; see also Kaye, supra note 88, at 203 (noting
that § 547(c)(2) would not protect most ordinary consumer credit transactions if the 45 day rule was strictly
construed because consumer purchases are often made more than 45 days before payment is due).
"'Although some argued that the rule could be interpreted to include such payments. See Tait & Williams,
supra note 36. To say the least, the courts were unreceptive to such arguments. See infra notes 119-132 and
accompanying text.
"One commentator noted that the 45 day requirement of § 547(c)(2) was "raised three times more frequently than all the other requirements of that subsection combined." Nutovic, supra note 10, at 177 n.l I.
" See supra note 15. One commentator, after discussing the possible problems with interpreting "ordinary"
as used in § 547(c)(2), stated that "[tlhere has been much more concern about this [problem] in the commentaries than in the cases." Herbert, supra note 14, at 692.
"'See, e.g., Barash, 658 F.2d at 510 ("Construing incurred to mean when the debtor first became legally
bound to pay comports not only with the plain meaning of the word, but also with the fundamental policy of
equality of distribution."); In re Iowa Premium Service Co., 695 F.2d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 1982).
"'Cf. In re Production Steel, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1 70,843, at 88,027; Herbert, supra note 14, at 681.
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legally owing? State law often came into play in deciding this question. 24
The courts generally held that a debt was incurred on the date that the
debtor received the benefit of the goods or services purchased, rather than on
the invoice date or due date.'25 However, for some types of debts, even this date
was hard to pin down. For example, debts for rent and insurance were generally held to have been incurred on the date each rent installment or premium
was due because this was considered the first date on which services were provided for each period.'26 On the other hand, utility debts were often considered
incurred on the date the meter was read.' 7 For goods shipped from the seller to
the buyer, the courts normally looked to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) to determine whether the debt was incurred on the date of shipment or of delivery.'28
With respect to principal payments on installment debts, the courts held
that the debt was incurred on the date that the obligation was first entered into, not on the date that each payment was due. 29 Thus, such payments were
usually not protected by 547(c) (2).130 The courts were split on whether interest
payments on installment obligations were within the 547(c) (2) exception.
Some felt that since interest accrues over time, the obligation to pay it arises at
the beginning of each installment period.'' Other courts felt that 547(c) (2)was
only meant to protect short-term debts and, thus, held that both the interest
and the principal portion of a debt were incurred when the obligation was first
'14See, e.g., In re Production Steel, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH), at 88,027 (U.C.C. applied). See Herbert, supra
note 14, at 680-89 for a thorough analysis of the various options for when a debt is incurred.
" See, e.g., In re Emerald Oil, 695 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1983) (debt incurred on date grain company exercised
option to purchase grain already in its possession); In re Chase & Sanborn, 51 Bankr. 734, 735 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1985); In re Brown, 20 Bankr. 554 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (credit card debt incurred on date of first
charge during each credit period); In re Ray W. Dickey & Sons, I I Bankr. 146 (Bankr. N.D. Tx. 1980)
Itelephone debt incurred on date first call made).
2
See, e.g., In re White River Corp., 50 Bankr. 403, 406-07 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (rent): In re Clothes Inc.,
45 Bankr. 419 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984) (rent); In re Advance Glove, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) I 70,505 16th Cir.
1985) (insurance premiums).
'2 1In re Georgia Steel, Inc., 38 Bankr. 839 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984); In re Kevdata Corp., 34 Bankr. 324
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1981).
"'In re Handsco Distrib., Inc., 51 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (date goods received): In re Chase &
Sanborn Corp., 51 Bankr. 736 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (date shipped); In re Production Steel, BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 70,843 (when delivered); In re Almarc Manuf., Inc., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 70,720 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1985) (date shipped or received depending on contract); In re Amex Trading Co., 37 Bankr. 793 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1983) (date shipped).
1'Barash.658 F.2d 509-Il. Barash was the seminal case on this point and its analysis was widely adopted by
other courts. The Barash court stated: "In short, the section 547(c)(2) exception is aimed at transactions
which, although they are technically credit transactions, are not intended to remain unpaid for a long time."
Id. at 511. This made sense at the time, given the 45 day requirement. Does it today? See supra notes
266-278 and accompanying text.
See also Tait & Williams, supra note 36, at 59-66 (where the authors argue that the due date should be the
date incurred in order to protect unsecured installment sellers).
"The only way a payment on a long-term installment obligation could receive protection was if the payment was made within 45 days after the obligation was first entered into. Thus, at best only two monthly installments could be protected.
"'See. e.g., In re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc., 10 Bankr. 632, 648 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), affd 23 Bankr.
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entered into.'32
The second major problem with the 45 day rule was determining the date
on which a payment by check was made. Was it the date that it was delivered
or the date that it was honored? The problem arose because in many cases the
debtor would deliver the check within the 45 day period, but it would be
honored after the 45 day period was over. The courts were split on the issue. 3 '
Courts holding that such a payment was valid relied primarily on a statement in the legislative history that a payment by check was the same as a cash
payment, unless the check was later dishonored.3 4 The courts holding that
such payments were not timely relied primarily on the UCC Article 3 concept
that a check does not vest the holder with any title or interest to the funds in a
checking account until it is honored."' The check payment problem was further confused by cases holding that a check was considered paid on the date of
delivery for 45 day rule purposes, but not for the 90 day requirement of section
547(b) (4). .36
In addition to the problems in applying 547(c) (2),'3 there was substantial
criticism of the scope of the exception itself. Section 547(c) (2) by its terms

necessarily included only short term debt; long-term installment transactions
were not covered. 3 Thus, many timely, good faith payments on "perfectly
legitimate ... credit transactions" were considered preferences. 39 Given the 45
'"2See, e.g., In re Iowa Premium Service Co., 676 F.2d 1220, 1221-22, rev'den banc: 695 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.
1982); In re Acme-Durham, 50 Bankr. 734, 740-41 (D. Me. 1985). The arguments on both sides of this issue
are thoroughly discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions of the two Iowa Premium Service decisions.
"'Holding that a payment by check was made when delivered: Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft, Inc., 680
F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Transpacific Carriers Corp., 50 Bankr. 649 (Bankr. D.S.N.Y. 1985); In re
Dependable Products, Inc., 51 Bankr. 338 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); O'Neill v. Nestle Libbys P.P., Inc., 739
F.2d 35 (Ist Cir. 1984); In re Hoover, BANKR. L. REP. 69,354 (Bankr. W.D. Ok. 1983). Holding contra:In
re Quality Holstein Leasing Inc., 46 Bankr. 70 (Bankr. N.D. Tx. 1985); In re Staveco Electrical Constr. Inc.,
48 Bankr. 247 (Bankr. N.J. 1985); In re Advance Glove Mfg. Co., 25 Bankr. 521 (E.D. Mich 1982).
"'The statement was made by Senator DeConcini to the Senate and by Congressman Edwards to the House:
"Contrary to language contained in the house report, payments of a debt by means of a check is equivalent
to a cash payment, unless the check is dishonored. Payment is considered to be made when a check is
delivered for purposes of Section 547(c)(I) and (2)." 124 CONG. REC.34000 (1978) (Statement of Sen. DeConcini);
124 CONG. REC. 32400 (1978) (Statement of Cong. Edwards) (emphasis added). This was probably a
misstatement; other legislative history clearly limits it to § 547(c)(1). See, e.g., Advance Glove. 25 Bankr. at
525-28. See also Herbert, supra note 14, at 689-91, for a thorough analysis of when a payment by check is
made. Herbert argues that the delivery date should be used "notwithstanding the fact that it has little U.C.C.
Logic." Id. at 691.
3'See U.C.C. 3-409 (West 1985).
"16See, e.g., Chase & Sanborn, 51 Bankr. 736 (S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co., 43 Bankr. 871
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984); see also In re Isis Foods, Inc., 37 Bankr. 334 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that a
check delivered before but honored after the filing of the bankruptcy petition was a post-petition transfer).
'Note that the "incurred" and "payment by check" problems would have eventually been worked out by
the courts.
"$See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text. One commentator noted that "unsecured creditors taking
payments or obtaining liens within the preference period [werel the most common victims of section
547(c)(2)." Ross, supra note 34, at 54; see also Tait & Williams, supra note 36 (authors argue that it is a
necessary and proper goal of bankruptcy to protect installment lenders).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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day rule, it was hard to argue that Congress intended for the exception to apply
40
to long-term transactions.'
But, section 547(c) (2) did not even adequately protect many short-term
credit transactions. Many such transactions are simply not completed within
45 days. The 45 day limit was apparently chosen because it was thought to
equal the normal trade credit cycle: goods or services provided throughout the
month, billed for at the end of the month, with payment within 15 days of billing.'' But this does not comport with reality; many industries have billing
cycles longer than 45 days' 2 and many other perfectly valid short-term credit
transactions are not completed within 45 days.' 3 Why should a creditor who
insists on payment within 45 days be protected, while another who, consistent
with industry practice, allows 60 days is not?
Clearly section 547(c) (2) had failed "to leave undisturbed normal financial
relations.' 4 4 Ordinary course transactions that had historically been protected

were no longer protected. 41 It provided little incentive for anyone to deal with
a failing debtor and, in fact, rewarded the creditors that demanded the strictest
terms. Moreover, it produced substantial litigation. Thus, it was not surprising
that Congress amended the section in 1984.
Arguably, Congress had several options available to it when it decided to
amend section 547(c) (2). It could have extended the 45 day rule to 90 or 100
days. This would have protected most truly short-term transactions, but it
would have not eliminated the problem of when a debt was incurred or the
check payment problem and it would have, again, left long-term creditors out
in the cold. The reasonable cause to believe requirement could have been reinstated, along with all the problems associated with it.'" Or, the entire excep-

tion could have been eliminated, but without it, there would be little incentive
for anyone to extend credit to troubled debtors. Instead, Congress chose to
eliminate the source of most of the litigation and criticism - the 45 day re-"But see Tait & Williams. supra note 36, where the authors made such an argument.
"'See, e.g.. Emerald Oil. 695 F.2d at 836. This explanation was first mentioned by Levin, who was a staff
member of a congressional committee that helped draft the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Levin, supra note 19, at
186. His theory/rationale was widely adopted by the courts. But see Fortgang & King, supra note 94, at 1167
("There seems to be no justifiable rationale for the choice of the number 45 as opposed to any other number
of days").
"4See Fortgang & King, supra note 94, at 1168. They listed, as an example of this, a retail seller of seasonal
goods who does not have the cash to pay for goods purchased until several months later. In addition, many
industries simply use a 60 or 90 day billing cycle.
"'Payment on credit card purchases is a good example. Normally, purchases for the entire month are billed
at the end of a month. Payment is generally due in 25 days. If something was purchased in the first 10 days
of the month, a timely payment on the twenty-fifth day would not be protected by the 45 day rule. The 45
day rule also caused substantial problems in the commercial paper market. See Fortgang & King, supra note
94, at !169-70.
'"H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 7, at 373.
"'Tait & Williams, supra note 36, at 55; supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
"lin 1983, the Senate considered a bill that would have reinstated the reasonable cause to believe requirerule. S.445, 98th Cong., IstSess. 3211 11983).
well
as eliminate the 45 day
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quirement. Given the options available, this was probably a wise choice.
However, the 1984 amendment has created much uncertainty. The
elimination of the 45 day rule leaves all of the emphasis on the three "ordinary
17
course" requirements. Since very few cases have yet addressed them, it will
be some time before the exact contours of the ordinary course requirements
are known. 4 1 In addition, the 1984 change expanded the scope of the exception,'"9 but how far? Are payments on all debt, both long and short-term, now
protected? If not, where is the line to be drawn? The legislative history of the
1984 amendment provides no help. 150
The remainder of this article will attempt to define the scope of section
547(c) (2) and provide a framework for analyzing cases that arise under it. The
logical place to start is with the principles developed under pre-1984 law.
'+Except in the most blatant "out of the ordinary course" transactions, courts seldom provided more than a
conclusory statement as to whether a transaction was ordinary. For the most part, the 45 day rule was determinative. If the payment was made within 45 days after the debt was incurred, it was protected: if not, it was
a preference.
'"(Y. B. WFINTRAUB & A. RFSNI( K. BANKRUPr(Y LAW MANUAL 1 7.05141. at 7-125 (rev. ed. 1986) (hereinafter BANKRUPR, LAW MANUAl_]. Removing the 45 day requirement "will ...place a greater emphasis
on the troubling task of interpreting and applying on a case by case basis the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs concept." Id.
"'See Nutovic, supra note 10, at 177: Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 23, at 266: BANKRUPTrY LAW
MANUAl. supra note 148, at 7-24.
'5"The legislative history of the 1984 amendment is surprisingly silent with respect to § 5471c)12). This is no
doubt because Congress was spending most of its time making sure that the 1984 amendment corrected the
problems created by the Marathon Oil and Bidlisco cases. The only real mention of § 5471c112) was in a question asked by Senator DeConcini to Senator Dole during the floor statements on the 1984 amendment.
Mr. DeCONCINI: I know that the Senator from Kansas, along with the Senator from South
of section 547 of the
Carolina, was the principal sponsor of this provision deleting subsection (c)(2)
code. and I would like to clarify two point regarding the effect of this change.
Am I correct that the elimination of the 45 day restriction in subsection (c)(2) of section 547 will
relieve buyers of commercial paper with maturities in excess of 45 days of the concern that
repayments of such paper at maturity might be considered as preferential transfers?
Mr. DOLE: This is correct, assuming that the "ordinary course of business or financial affairs" and
"ordinary business terms" requirements are met.
Mr. DeCONCINI: Would there be any doubt that companies that have a need for short-term
funds, and investors who wish to purchase short-term obligations, would both be acting in their
respective "ordinary course of business or financial affairs" if they were to deal directly or indirectly
with each other in the commercial paper market? And would not the payment of a commercial paper
note at maturity be in accordance with "ordinary business terms"?
Mr. DOLE: Those understandings are correct. The commercial paper market is an established
market, and participants in it would presumably be acting in the ordinary course of their business or
financial affairs and on the basis of ordinary business terms.
Floor Statement on H.R. 5174 IP.L. 98-353), 130 CoN;. REC.8887, 8897 (June 29, 19841. This brief exchange provides little, if any, insight into Congress' intent in amending § 5471c)12.
Note also that there were some hearings held in 1980 and 1981 regarding the problems the 45 day rule
was causing in the commercial paper market. See Preference Section of the Bankruptcy Code S. 3023. hearings before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Senate Judiciary Committee JAug.
18. 19801: Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Senate Judiciary
Committee 230-74 (April 3, 6, 1981). The elimination of the 45 day rule was obviously meant to do more
than just protect the commercial paper market. This is supported by the fact that in 1980 the Senate considered a bill that was aimed solely at protecting the commercial paper market. S.3023, 98th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 11980. If Congress had intended to only protect the commercial paper market, it would have adopted
an amendment similar to the one considered by the Senate in 1980.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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CASES UNDER PRE-1984 LAW

The term "ordinary," which is used in all three of the remaining requirements of 547(c) (2), is inherently vague, and Congress' lack of guidance as
to its intended meaning leaves much discretion to the courts interpreting the
requirements.' Moreover, given the almost infinite variety of transactions
that debtors and creditors enter into, it is difficult, especially at this early date,
to categorize the cases that may arise under section 547(c) (2) except in the
most general terms. Each case, to a large extent, will have to be decided on its
principles may be derived from the cases
own facts. However, some general
2
that have been decided thus far.1
Most transfers that are denied section 547(c) (2) protection fail because
they violate either 547(c) (2) (B) or 547(c) (2) (C), or both.'53 In other words it is
the transfer, not the underlying debt, that is usually found offensive."' But
what makes a transfer offensive to 547(c) (2)?
The courts have looked at whether the transaction deviated from normal
business practice and, specifically, whether "the debtor or creditor [did]
anything abnormal to gain an advantage over other creditors. . ."I" In deter-

mining what is "unusual" or "abnormal" or what "deviates from normal
business" practice, the courts have relied heavily on the parties' previous,
similar transactions.'56 If they have not done business together before, or have
done so only on an infrequent basis, similar transactions between the debtor
and creditor and other parties become relevant.' 57 Some courts have held that
the standards and practices in the parties' industry are important.5 8 An ex'lnre Economy Milling Co., 37 Bankr. 914, 921-23 JD.S.C. 1983) ("Unfortunately, the legislative history of
the (ode provides no guidance as to the content of these phrases and. again, since the concept is new to
bankruptcy law there is no developed base of case law upon which to draw") Id. at 221-22.
2
5 A proper analysis of whether a transfer falls within the ordinary course of business exception requires two
separate examinations. First, § 547(c1121)A) requires that the debt underlying the transfer be "incurred by the
debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the" creditor. Second, §
547(cl(2llB and IC) require that the transfer itself be "made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the" creditor and "according to ordinary business terms." Unfortunately. most of the
opinions do not explicitly do this. This generally does not cause a problem when examining an opinion
because it is usually obvious whether the court found the transfer or the debt or both offensive. However, a
problem is created by the courts' failure to segregate out what aspects of a transfer violate § 547(cl)2)IB) and
what aspects violate § 547(c)121(C). Because of this, the following discussion will not attempt to do so, unless
the court in the case being examined did. However, the analysis in the following section will distinguish between the two, because the author feels that it is necessary in order to develop a reasoned approach to §
547(c)(21 questions which can be consistently applied.
"'This paper will refer to the subsections of § 5471c12). as renumbered by the 1984 amendments.
"'Thisis not surprising because in most situations the debt is already incurred when the impetus for granting
or receiving a preference arises.
"In re Economy Milling, 37 Bankr. at 922.
'6See. e.g.. In re Production Steel. BANKR. L. Rtt (CCH) at 88,029 1I"Section 547)c)(2l(C)j implies consistency between other, but similar, transactions between the debtor and the creditor.": Ames Trading. 37 Bankr.
at 796.
''Nutovic, supra note 10, at 184; Economy Milling, 37 Bankr. at 922. Note that "lal transaction can be ordinary and still occur only occasionally." Id.
Steel. BANKR. L. REP.
'See Production
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amination of a few cases will illustrate the courts' general approach in determining whether a transfer fulfills 547(c) (2) (B) and 547(c) (2) (C).
In
The court found an "unusual" transaction in In re Williams.'
Williams the debtor purchased a fence from Sears, Roebuck & Co. on credit,
with Sears retaining a security interest in the fence. The debtor usually made
monthly payments of $26 and occasionally made payments of $50 or $56
when he missed the previous month's payments. 16 However, during the month
in which he filed for bankruptcy, he made two payments to Sears of $264.83
and $80.00.161 Since these payments extinguished the debt, Sears released the
security interest. 2 The court had no trouble finding that section 547(c) (2) did
not apply to the two transfers. It stated that the final two payments could
"hardly be said to follow the ordinary course of repayment established between
the parties."'63
Another case relying heavily on the parties' past dealings is In re Ferguson. "I In Ferguson, the bankruptcy trustee sued to recover a transfer of
$12,499.32 made to the creditor shortly before bankruptcy which completely
satisfied his debt with the creditor. 6 ' The debtor was a pork farmer who regularly purchased supplies from the creditor. He was billed monthly and was expected to pay by the fifth day of the following month. But the evidence indicated that the debtor's practice was to pay what he could against the debt, usually
in increments of $1,000.00'" It was also shown that the debtor's average account balance with the creditor was seldom substantially reduced by the
monthly payments.'6 7 However, this was not enough. The only unusual aspects
of the transfer was that it was rather large in comparison to previous transfers.
The court held that the transfer was not extraordinarily large because the two
previous transfers were for $5,000 and $16,000.6' The court also felt that it
was not extraordinary for the debtor to pay off the entire debt since he was terminating his business. 69 Thus, the payment was protected by section 547(c) (2).
The analysis in Fergusonis somewhat suspect. First, the fact that a debtor
is terminating his business should not justify a payment that extinguishes the
entire debt. 70 The payment should be viewed in light of a continuing
"5 Bankr. 706 IS.D. Ohio 1980).
'111d. at 707.
'"'Id.
i2Id.

'3 d.
' 41 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
' Id. at 119.
"-Id.at 119, 121.
'I d. at 119.
1' d. at 121.
W'Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
"'Nutovic. supra note 10, at 182, 184-85, analyzes and criticizes
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business. 7 ' If so viewed, the payment in Ferguson was not ordinary since the
debtor was not in the practice of paying off the entire account. Second, the
amount of the payment should be compared to all previous payments. The
court apparently did not do this; it only noted that the two previous payments
were of $5,000 and $16,000. If other payments were normally not that large,
then the fact that the final three payments were large is indicative of unusual
dealings and should not be used to justify the large amount of the final payment.'72
Even seemingly minor deviations from the parties' past dealings have
been held unusual when combined with other suspect aspects of a transaction.
For example, in In re Ewald Brothers, Inc., 'I the debtor was to make a single
payment to the creditor on July 25. Instead, it made two separate payments;
one on August 1, the other on August 6. The debtor had never split payments
before. The court held that "neither payment was made in the ordinary course
of the parties' business or according to ordinary business terms," relying both
on the fact that the payments were split up and the fact that they were made
late.'

It is not surprising that the courts have refused to apply the ordinary
course exception when the sales and/or credit terms used are different from the
parties' past practices. In In re Production Steel, Inc.'" the creditor, after learning of the debtor's financial problems, imposed several additional terms which
had not been used in previous transactions between the parties. It required the
debtor to secure payment of the debt with a letter of credit, to make a large
down payment, and to issue the creditor a post-dated check.' 76 The court found
177
that these additional terms caused the transaction to fail under 547(c) (2) (B).
It also held that the transaction failed under 547(c) (2)(C) because no evidence
was presented to show that these were ordinary business terms in the steel industry.' The court also noted that while each term individually may very well
have been an ordinary business term, the creditor must establish that using
them all together "constitute[d] a transaction made according to ordinary
business terms.' 79
Several cases have held that a transfer does not have to be in the form of
"'ld.at 184-85.
'"See also infra note 254.
145 Bankr. 52 (D. Minn. 1984).
1'4d. at 59. See infra notes 190-196 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of late payments.
"'BANKR. L. REP.

70,843, at 88,026.

"'Id. at 88,029.
1,77d.

7'Id. at 88,030. The court felt that § 547(c)(2)(B) provides a subjective test while § 547(c)(2)(C) provides an
objective test. This is a good way to approach these two requirements, which will be discussed in more detail
later. See infra notes 243-249 and accompanying text.
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cash or a check to be considered ordinary. For example, sellers often allow
buyers to return unwanted or unused goods in exchange for a credit to the
buyer's account. Such a transaction is a transfer that could be voided as a
preference. However, if this is an ordinary practice between the parties, the
courts have held such transfers to be exempt under section 547(c) (2). s°
In W.L. Jackson Manufacturing,' the debtor was a manufacturer of
water heaters and water pump tanks which it sold through dealers. The dealers
agreed to inspect any defective tanks for the debtor, who would honor any
warranty claims by crediting the dealer's open account." 2 The court held that
this practice was protected by section 547(c) (2).183
A similar problem occurs when a debtor both buys from and sells to a particular creditor. While such parties normally settled their debts in cash or by
check, one of them may occasionally pay the other by sending it goods. In re
Amex Trading Co.'14 the debtor and creditor were chemical brokers who frequently bought and sold chemicals between themselves. During the 90 days
prior to the debtor's entry into bankruptcy, the debtor shipped a barge of
chemicals to the creditor. The debtor's account (debt) with the creditor was
credited by the amount of the chemicals.' There was some evidence presented
"that this use of credit took place reciprocally between the debtor and the
creditor and between the creditor and other[s]."' ' The court held that the
transfer was protected by 547(c) (2).1 s7
Transactions like the one in Amex Tradingshould be protected if the parties had engaged in similar transactions in the past, especially if they are common in the parties' industry. It is well established that a transaction can occur
only occasionally and still be considered ordinary."' The fact that the parties
have a practice of using more than one method to settle debts should not,
without more, prevent one from receiving section 547(c) (2) protection just
because the judge feels that it is an "unusual" method of payment. However,
one court has shown some displeasure with similar transactions." 9
""See, e.g., Amex Trading, 37 Bankr. at 796; cf In re W.L. Jackson Manufacturing Co., 50 Bankr. 498
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).

1"50 Bankr. 498.
" id.at 500.
1111d. at 505-06. The court so held even though during the 90 days prior to bankruptcy the debtor apparently
honored the dealer's claims by sending free tanks, rather than crediting its account. The court did not discuss
the distinction. It could be argued that sending free tanks was not in the parties' ordinary course of business.
However, the decision is probably correct. There is little practical difference between the two practices; the
dealer receives "free" tanks either way.
'37 Bankr. 793.
114d. at 795.

"'Id.at 800.
"'Id. at 801.
"'See, e.g., In re Economy Milling, Inc., 37 Bankr. 914.
'"In re Gold Coast Seed Co., 24 Bankr. 595 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 1982). In Gold Coast Seed the debtor paid

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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Late payments are often held not to have been made in the ordinary
course of business or according to ordinary business terms. For example, in In
re Ewald Brothers, 19o
the trustee sued to recover three payments which were 7,

9, and 12 days late. 9 ' While the court noted that the debtor's recent payments
had become increasingly late, it found that the payments were "outside the
parties' established practice of making and accepting payments one or two
days after their official due date.'92
It seems clear that late payments should not be considered "ordinary
course" when the debtor normally pays on time. But what if the debtor has
established a practice of paying several days (or weeks) after the due date? The
court in Ewald hinted, in dicta, that it might be possible to prove that the debtor had established a practice of making late payments.' But it is hard to argue
that such a practice is according to ordinary business terms."' The 547(c) (2)
(C) requirement was, no doubt, put in to prevent protection when the terms of
payment, though normal for the parties, are not accepted practices for most
businesses. 9 s Regularly accepting late payments is not normal for most
businesses and not the kind of conduct Congress intended 547(c) (2) to protect.
However, requiring payment exactly on the due date is too much; payments
that are made within one or two days of the due date should be protected
whether or not the debtor had an established practice of making payment one
or two days late. This is not the kind of "unusual conduct" that Congress intended to be excluded from 547(c) (2) protection. 196
evidence that this type of transaction was "ordinary in the seed trade and in the parties' past dealings." The
debt arose from a previous breach of contract by the debtor and the transfer/payment was overdue, both of
which are probably sufficient to remove § 547(c)(2) protection. The court held that "the transfer was a simple preference without business justification" and based its decision in part on the fact that the value of the
seed transferred was almost an exact offset of the debt. This should not matter if the practice was, in fact.
commonly used in the industry and by the parties themselves in past transactions.
'"45 Bankr. 52.
"id. at 57-59.
"'id at 57; see also In re Gold Coast Seed, 24 Bankr. 595 (where the court in holding that a transfer was not
in the ordinary course of business relied, inter alia, on the fact that the payment was almost a week late); In
re Brenton's Cove Dev. Co., 52 Bankr. 287 (court in denying § 547(c)(2) protection relied in part on the fact
that the debt was over six months overdue when an escrow account was set up to secure payment on the
debt).
"'Ewald Bros.. 45 Bankr. at 57. A different, but somewhat analogous argument was rejected in In re Morris,
53 Bankr. 190 (D. Ore. 1985). There, the trustee argued that it was the debtor's normal course of business to
make late payments and, therefore, a timely payment was not in the ordinary course of business. Cf.in re
Triple A Coal Co., 41 Bankr. 641 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
While he concedes that some of the debts which Triple A allegedly owes him were incurred outside of
the 45 day period, and admits that the business methods of the debtors were unorthodox, he asserts
that the helter-skelter fashion in which these debts arose and were paid was simply the debtors' ordinary way of doing business.
We cannot agree, either as a matter of fact or law.
Id.at 645.
I"II U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C).
"'See infra notes 261-263 and accompanying text.
",1t should be noted that "late payment" cases will probably become more common since the 45 day rule has
been removed. See In re Staveco Elec. Constr. Inc., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1 70,502 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985)
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The court in Ewald also held that a payment by a "NSF" check, which
later cleared after being redeposited, was not protected by section 547(c) (2).' 7
The court stated that "it is difficult to conceive of an 'ordinary' business practice that includes payments to a creditor by way of NSF checks."'98 Quite clearly, this is the type of unusual action that Congress intended to prevent with
preference law.
Another factor which has played a role in 547(c) (2) cases is creditor
pressure. Examples of creditor pressure include threats to file a lawsuit, to join
an involuntary bankruptcy petition, to foreclose on a security interest or to call
on a personal guarantee.
Probably the best example of creditor pressure to date occurred in In re
Craig Oil Co. 99 There the creditor was asked to join an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the debtor.2 0 At the time the debtor was over its credit limit
with the creditor, but was making regular, timely payments. 0° After being asked
to join the involuntary petition, the creditor contacted the debtor and "suggested" that it could show its "good faith" by making future payments by
cashier's check, instead of by corporate check as it had done in the past. 2 ' The
debtor continued to make these "good faith" payments after it quit purchasing
from the creditor.0 3 The court, relying heavily on the creditor pressure, held
that the "payments ...by cashier's checks were made neither in the ordinary

course of [the creditor's] business or [the debtor's] business nor according to
their ordinary business terms." 2°0
Creditor pressure also played an important role in In re Brentons Cove
Development Corp.05 There, the creditor was a condominium owners' association and the debtor was the condominium project developer. When the debt
was not paid, the Association filed suit and "after extensive negotiation efforts
...funds

[to cover the debt] were finally escrowed." 206 "This occurred.., more

547(c)(2)1(B) or (C)).
What about early payments when the debtor normally pays on time? An early payment in and of itself
should probably not be condemned. But if accompanied by creditor pressure or other unusual action, maybe
an early payment should probably be denied protection.
"'Ewald Bros., 45 Bankr. at 57-58.
'Sd.at 58 n. 14. The creditor had argued that this had happened twice before and, therefore, it was in the
parties' ordinary course of business. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to show that it had
happened before. But even if the creditor had established that it had happened before, the court clearly
would still have denied § 547(c)(2) protection. See id. at 58.
1"31 Bankr. 402 (M.D. Ga. 1983), order affd 785 F.2d 1563 (I th Cir. 1986).
mId. at 403.
201 d.

"2Id. In addition, Craig's president and his wife had personally guaranteed the debt. Id.
03id. at 406.
mid. The court was quick to point out "that payment by certified or cashier's check is not outside the scope
of ordinary business practice in and of itself." Id.

"52 Bankr. 287.
mid. at 292.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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than six months after the debt was incurred ... and only four days before the

' The court held that the transfer into esfiling of the bankruptcy petition."207
crow was a "classic preference" that was not intended to receive protection.

Should creditor pressure, in and of itself, prevent a transaction from falling within the ordinary course of business exception? Probably not. Such
pressure should become relevant only when it has resulted in some change in
the way the parties do business. Smart creditors pay attention to their debtor's
financial condition and if it appears shaky, will make further inquiries and
possibly ask for some assurances. Such conduct should not be punished. Section 547(c) (2)protection should only be denied when such "inquiries" or "suggestions" result in terms or conditions that are different from the parties' past
dealings. In such cases, the creditor is using pressure to receive preference over
other creditors.2
In the vast majority of cases, the debt underlying the preferential transfer
is "incurred in the ordinary course of business. ' 2t0 However, in some cases the
lack of "ordinariness" of the underlying debt is the deciding factor. In other
cases, the court's displeasure with the debt and the facts surrounding it influences the court's analysis of the other two requirements.
Probably the most blatant example of debts that are not incurred in the
ordinary course of business are those arising out of "Ponzi" schemes.", The
courts feel that such schemes are so inherently fraudulent and unfair that
transfers to both organizers and participants of the schemes are not protected
by section 547(c) (2).2 1 The courts have all noted, no doubt correctly, that Congress did not intend for the exception to apply to such deals." 3
21Id.
0ld. "These facts fit the classic preference situation of a long overdue obligation, pressure exerted by the
creditor, and a lump sum payment made shortly before the filing of the bankruptcy petition." Id. See also In
re Production Steel. BANKR. L. REP. (CCH), at 88,029, where the court in holding that 5471c12) did not apply, relied in part on the fact that "demand for the balance of the contract price was made before due under
the contract and the demand was accompanied by a treat to call upon [al letter of credit."
"Query: Should a creditor who is asked to join an involuntary petition or who holds a personal guarantee of
the debtor's president but who is paid on time be protected while most all other creditors are not paid at all?
See infra notes 279-283 and accompanying text.
2IU.S.C. § 5471c)(2)IA).
A "Ponzi" scheme, as that term is generally used, refers to an investment scheme in which returns to
211
investors are not financed through the success of the underlying business venture, but are taken from
principal sums of newly attracted investments. Typically, investors are promised large returns for
their investments. Initial investors are actually paid the promised returns, which attract additional investors.
In re Independent Clearing House Co., 41 Bankr. 985, 994 n.12 ID. Utah 1984l. They are named after
Charles Ponzi, "the eponymous architect of the 'ponzi' scheme." Id. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. I
11924).
"'See. e.g.. In re Western World Funding, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 70,828 (Bankr. D. Nev. 19851 linsiders.
organizers); In re, Western World Funding, 52 Bankr. 743 IBankr. D. Neb. 19851 (investors Independent
Clearing House Co., 41 Bankr. 985 (investors). The courts always find that such transfers violate all three requirements.
2
"AII of these transactions were unusual, extraordinary, and unrelated to any business enterprise whose
protection was intended by the drafters of section 5471c)(2)." Independent Clearing House Co.. 41 Bankr. at
Published
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Corporate repayments of shareholder loans are often held not to be protected when the corporation is chronically undercapitalized or badly in need of
funds because of short-term cash flow problems when the loan ismade. A good
example of this is In re Fulghum Construction Corp.2" ' In that case the sole
shareholder of the debtor regularly advanced money so that it could meet its
payroll obligations." 5 The debtor built oil pipelines - a business which requires a large amount of working capital."6 The court found that the debtor
had been undercapitalized ever since the shareholder purchased it." 7 The loan
repayments were not given 547(c) (2) protection." 8
In In re Arctic Air Conditioning, Inc.,2"9 the wife of the corporation's
president made a loan to the corporation so that it could pay back-taxes owed
to the IRS. " ' As in Fulghurt, the corporation was experiencing cash flow problems and intended to pay off the loans with proceeds of work currently in process." The court held that "Injeither the loan nor the repayment thereof was in

the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the [wife).

2

The Fulghum court indicated that the loans were improper because they
were not "established financial transactions between a debtor and a lending institution.123 This goes too far. Loans are often given by entities besides traditional lending institutions and such loans generally do not pose any harm that
would justify depriving them of 547(c) (2)protection. Moreover, the fact that a
loan is given by a shareholder or other insider should not categorically prevent
it from receiving section 547(c) (2) protection. The better view is that only
when the business is experiencing cash flow problems should such loans be
suspect. In such a case, the proper thing for the shareholder/partner/proprietor
2
to do is to make equity contributions, not loans.
It is important to note that, while the non-arms length nature of such
transactions may make them suspect, insider debts are by no means exempt
from protection. For example, in In re Fuighum, the court held that rental
'"45 Bankr. 112 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 19841.
"Id. at 115.
'Id. at 116.
21-

Id.

""'These short-term loans were made by the defendant to the debtor in order to allow the debtor to maintain
operations despite its capitalization problems. Such transactions are not excepted from avoidance under the
..ordinary course of business ' exception found within § 547(c)(2)." Id,
:"35 Bankr. 107 1Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 19831.
"ld. at 108.
- Id.
2
': d. at 110.
-1t re Fuighum Constr. Co.. 45 Bankr. at 116 n.4.
-"'The same should be true in other similar transactions, such as where a shareholder rents equipment to a
corporation. There are often non-bankruptcy related reasons for doing this le.g.. tax benefits). The fact that
the shareholder is not in the business of renting equipment should not matter. But see id. at 118 Icourt relied,
at least in part, on the fact that the shareholder was in the business of renting similar equipment).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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payments to the shareholder for equipment leased to the debtor were protected. 2 The court noted that the shareholder owned a company that leased
such equipment and that the rental charge was reasonable.226 Likewise, reasonable reimbursements to officers, directors and other insiders for such things as
medical expenses and business-related entertainment and travel expenses can
receive protection.227
Another category of debt often held as not having been made in the ordinary course of business is debt which arises from a previous breach of contract. In In re Kennesaw Mint, Inc., 28 the trustee sued to recover payments
made to a person who advanced money to the debtor so the debtor could purchase 20,000 ounces of silver for him. The debtor failed to purchase the silver,
but paid some of the money back via several transfers during the 90 day

preference period. The court rejected the contention that the transfers were
covered by 547(c) (2).229 This is probably a proper result. It is hard to argue that
debts created by a breach are incurred in the ordinary course of business. Furthermore, protecting payments made on such debts will not, in all reality,
lessen the creditor's disincentive to deal with the debtor that was created by the
breach itself. 3°
A few cases have stated that a debt incurred after the debtor has closed its
business is not incurred in the ordinary course of business. In In re Peninsula
Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc.,23' the creditor/attorney refused to do any further
work until he was paid for past services. The debtor then assigned some accounts receivables to the attorney. When the receivables were paid the attorney used some of the proceeds to pay off the accumulated debt and put the
11145 Bankr. at 118.
226Id.
227

See In re Top Sport Distrib., Inc., 41 Bankr. 235 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984). As to such payments the court
stated:
The payments and reimbursements appear to have been part of a well established, continuous, ordinary and reasonable business practice of TOP SPORT for at least five (5) years prior to the
bankruptcy proceeding. TOP SPORT's obligation to pay these expenses was incurred in the ordinary
course of its business. The expenses were paid currently, in the ordinary and normal course of its
business under ordinary business terms....
Id. at 239.
2232 Bankr. 799 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
2-Nd. at 805. This is a good example of a case where the court did not explicitly state that the debt was not incurred in the ordinary course of business because it arose out of a breach. But, it is obvious from the tone of
the opinion that the court felt that way. It noted that "Itihe ordinary course of business of the debtor was refining and selling process metal," implying that it was not his ordinary course of business to breach contracts. Id.
See also In re Gold Coast Seed 24 Bankr. 595 (where a breach caused the underlying debt, but the court
relied on other factors in holding that section 547(c)(2) did not apply).
'Of course, just because the underlying debt involved a breach which was later cured does not exempt a
transaction from § 5471c)(2) protection. See In re Nepsco, Inc., 49 Bankr. 152 (D.Me. 1985). In Nepsco. the
creditor shipped goods to the debtor which were rejected as non-conforming. The creditor then shipped conforming goods. The court held that a payment on the conforming goods was protected by § 547(c)(2). Id. at
154.
11'9 Bankr. 257 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
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rest in a trust fund to be drawn on as he performed future services. 32 The court
held that the transfer to satisfy the old debt was a preference and rejected the
attorney's argument that 547(c) (2) should apply, largely because the debtor
had discontinued its business before the services were performed. "
Kallen v. Lita 2 41 is a similar case. There, the debtor's business was destroyed in a fire and the creditor/law firm was retained, on a contingency fee
basis, to recover for damages caused by the fire. After the claim was settled,
the law firm was paid out of the settlement proceeds. When the trustee sued to
avoid the transfer, the attorney claimed that section 547(c) (2) was applicable.
The court rejected this, mostly because the court felt that section 547(c) (2)was
for "normal trade credit transactions ... such as the sale of goods by a business
supplier on account.""23 The court further justified its decision by noting that
the debtor had closed his business before the law firm was hired.236
It is unclear as of yet whether this analysis carries forward to other
creditors who extend credit after the debtor has discontinued business. It could
be argued that this should only apply to attorneys and other parties with a
special relationship to the debtor, such as insiders and accountants.237 On the
other hand, there is merit to the position that payments on any debt incurred
after the debtor ceases business should not receive protection. First, how can a
business which is no longer operating have an "ordinary course of business"?
Second, and possibly more important, protecting such payments does not really advance the policies behind 547(c) (2). When the debtor's business is shut
down there is no longer any reason to encourage dealing with him. Likewise,
there are no "normal financial relations" to protect. Of course, in some instances it may be necessary to incur some debt in order to preserve the assets of
a business which is no longer in operation. But in most cases, the more reasoned view is that debts incurred after the debtor has closed down are not incurred in the ordinary course of business.
Several cases reveal the necessity of putting on evidence of the parties'
previous dealings with each other and of the standards in their industry. 38 This
'2 1d. at 259.
3
" ld. at 261-62.

11'47 Bankr. 977 (N.D. III. 19851.
111d. at 984. This, in and of itself, is not an adequate justification for the decision. Attorneys and others performing services on credit are entitled to § 547(c)(2) protection.
1%ld.
2
The rationale for singling out such parties is that they generally know that the debtor is no longer in
business, and, in addition, have specific knowledge of the debtor's financial condition. While knowledge,
motive and intent are no longer elements of preference law, they are and should be considered when determining whether a debt or transfer is "ordinary."
"'See, e.g., Production Steel, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) at 88,030 (where the court denied that a transaction was
made according to ordinary business terms entirely because the creditor had not put on evidence as to the
standard business terms in the parties' industry); Economy Milling, 37 Bankr. 914, 921-22 § 547(c)(2) was
held not applicable because no ordinary course evidence was presented, even though the court stated that
such a showing would have been easy to make); In re Super Market Distributors Corp., BANKR. L. REP.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
28
(CCH) 1 68,896 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (evidence presented held insufficient).

DeSimone: Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code

Summer, 19861

SECTION 547(c)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

should be done even if the debt, transfer and terms are all obviously ordinary
as between the parties and within the industry. 3 9 Most courts have held that
the parties' testimony as to the "ordinariness" of a transaction is sufficient.4
However, some courts have shown some hostility to labeling a transaction
which appears somewhat unusual as "ordinary." Thus, when the transaction
may appear to an outsider as being unusual or involves a large sum of money,
use of "expert" testimony is probably best, even if it is only the testimony of
another member of the industry.
In addition to the various factors listed above, courts have relied on
several other factors in denying 547(c) (2)protection.2 41 However, one of them
alone, if relatively minor, may not be enough to prevent the transaction from
being "ordinary. 2' ' 2 But, the combination of several minor problems is usually
enough to deny protection. In the final analysis, it is the quality, not the quantity, of the negative factors that should determine whether a transaction
receives section 547(c) (2)protection.
SECTION

547(c) (2) ANALYSIS:

SOME SUGGESTIONS

The biggest criticism of 547(c) (2)cases lies with the lack of structure in
the analysis of the ordinary course requirements. Most of the cases seem correct in that they generally uphold Congress' intent. However, the courts
seldom identify which aspects of the transaction violate which ordinary course
element, and frequently do not even identify which element was violated. In
addition, few courts state whether the specific elements are to be measured
against an objective or subjective standard, or both. The following discussion
will provide some suggestions for analyzing future cases.
The first step is to decide whether each ordinary course requirement provides a subjective standard, an objective standard, or both an objective and a
subjective standard, against which to measure the transaction in question.
There is little doubt that Congress intended for potential 547(c) (2)transfers to
be judged both objectively and subjectively. It would be difficult to "preserve
normal financial relations" without relying primarily on the parties' past con23

See Economy Milling, 37 Bankr. 914. In Economy Milling the creditor, a grain elevator company, exercised an option to purchase grain already in its possession. It then made two $ 1,000 payments for the grain
to the creditor/farmer during the preference period. This was more than likely a common transaction for the
elevator and the farmer, but the district court upheld the bankruptcy court's determination that neither the
debt nor the transfer were incurred in the ordinary course of business. The district court stated that such a
showing would have been easy to make.
2
"'See,
e.g., Amex Trading Co., 37 Bankr. at 799-80 (the only such testimony was that of the debtor and
creditor's employees).
24
1 A

good example of this are the three transfers which were denied protiction in Ewald Bros.. 45 Bankr. 52.

One of the transfers was made by a NSF check, which was later honored. The other two were made by split
payments. All three were late. The court relied on all of the factors in rendering its decision.
2
'For example, split payments, the last of which is only one or two days late, may be protected.
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duct." 3 Of course, some transactions clearly were not intended to receive
547(c) (2)protection, no matter how ordinary they are to the parties." Thus,
an objective standard is also needed. The question is: What standard does each
element require?
The court in In re ProductionStee 45 felt that 547(c) (2)(B)provides a subjective standard, while 547(c) (2) (C) provides an objective standard. Section
547(c) (2) (B)states that the payment must be made in the "ordinary course of
business of the debtor and the transferee [i.e., creditor]. -10 Given its focus on
the parties'course of business, it is proper to consider it as setting out a subjective test. In contrast, the failure of section 547(c) (2)(C) to mention the parties
when it speaks of ordinary business terms indicates that it isan objective standard. 7 It could be argued that section 547(c) (2)(C)contains both an objective
and a subjective element. However, the parties' "ordinary business terms" are
easily included within their "ordinary course of business or financial affairs."
Any further distinction is unnecessary; having one element focus subjectively
on the transfer, while the other looks at it objectively is less confusing and
leads to a clearer analysis.
Section 547(c) (2) (A) requires that the debt be "incurred

. .

. in the or-

dinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
' Based on the previous paragraph, it would appear logical to contransferee."248
clude that it provides only a subjective standard. However, existing case law is
to the contrary. Take for example the cases involving "Ponzi" schemes. The
debts in those cases were not denied protection because they were not "ordinary" for the parties. Rather, the courts felt that they were not the type of
debts that Congress meant to insulate from preference treatment; they were
not ordinary from an objective standard. Likewise, some debts have been held
not to be "ordinary" from a subjective viewpoint (e.g., debts arising from a
previous breach of contract). Thus, section 547(c) (2) (A) contains both objective and subjective elements.4 9
The next step is to determine how the elements are to be applied in agiven
case. Since, in most cases, it is the transfer and not the debt that isin question,
the following discussion will focus primarily on 547(c) (2)(B)and 547(c) (2)(C),
241
Most of the cases thus far have been decided almost exclusively by comparing the transaction in question
with the parties' past transactions.
2M
For example, debts arising out of Ponzi schemes. See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying text.
25

' BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 70,843.
2"I I U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
14TBut see Craig Oil, 31 Bankr. at 402 ("Ithe Court finds that Craig's payments to Marathon by cashier's
checks were made neither in the ordinary course of Marathon's business or Craig's business nor according to
their ordinary business terms."). Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
2411 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C).
2

'Logically, this does not make much sense when compared with the discussion in the previous paragraph of
the text and with the similar language in § 547(c)(2)(B). But, from a practical viewpoint, it is hard to argue
that § 547(c)(2)(A) should not contain an objective element.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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although the concepts, for the most part, will apply to 547(c) (2) (A).
As mentioned, 547(c) (2) (B) looks at the parties' past conduct. This makes
sense. Congress decided that "normal," ordinary transactions are to be protected from preference attack; unusual transactions are not. The primary
method of determining whether a transaction is normal is to look at past dealings. Transactions which do not conform to past dealings are "unusual" and
should not be protected. If the parties have previously done business with each
other, then those transactions should be examined to see if the present one is
within their ordinary course of business.50 If not, then the parties' past dealings
with other, similar parties should be the benchmark. 21 But how close should
the transfer at hand be to past transactions?
Thus far, most courts have been relatively strict and required that the
transaction closely conform to past dealings.2 1 2 This is proper. Remember that
since intent and bad motive are no longer preference elements, virtually all
transfers on antecedent debt made within 90 days of bankruptcy are subject to
preference attack. Section 547(c) (2) was meant to taper this in order to protect
ordinary course transfers, which historically had been protected by the
"reasonable cause to believe" requirement. But, if the exception is too broadly
applied, preference law will become largely meaningless. Thus, strict compliance is proper, if not essential, to ensure that the policies behind preference
law are upheld.
For example, if the debtor is normally billed on the first of the month and
pays on the tenth (the due date), then the court should require payment by the
tenth or eleventh. Likewise, if in the past the debtor was always given 30 days
to pay and paid with a corporate check, then a change to payment by cashier's
check within 10 days should not be considered as ordinary. 53
The harder questions arise when the parties' previous dealings are not so
exact. How much latitude should the court allow? In general, if the parties'
past conduct varied, but had ascertainable, reasonable boundaries, then the
court should consider any transaction that falls within those boundaries as ordinary. For example, assume that the debtor is an electrical contractor and the
creditor is an electrical supply company. The debtor purchases supplies on
credit as needed for each project he is working on. He pays for all supplies pur250This is not to say that the parties can receive protection by establishing a totally random, haphazard
course of business and showing that the transaction in question fell within it. Cf. Triple A Coal Co., 41
Bankr. 641, 645. Such conduct is policed by § 547(c)(2)(C). Section 547(c)(2)(B) just establishes that the
transfer was within the parties' past conduct.
151Examining dealings with third parties does not remove the subjectivity of the test. It is still looking at how
this creditor deals with his debtors and how this debtor deals with his creditors.
"'This will no doubt continue, since the section has otherwise been broadened by the removal of the 45 day
requirement.
"'Given this scenario, early payment by means of a cashier's check is indicative of the kind of "unusual action" Congress intended to prevent. Cf. Craig Oil, 31 Bankr. 402 (discussed supra at notes 199-204).
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chased for a project within two weeks of completion. Since some projects take
only a few days and others may take months, the time between purchase and
payment necessarily varies. Yet, any payment within two weeks of completing
the project that the payment relates to should be considered ordinary." '
Does this analysis extend to situations like the one in In re Ferguson?"'In
that case, the debtor was a pig farmer who regularly purchased supplies on
credit from the creditor. The creditor billed him at the end of the month, and
payment was to be made on a set date in the following month." 6 In practice,
however, the debtor paid what he could against the debt, usually in increments
of $ 1000.257 The payments would seldom coincide with the purchases made in
the previous month and seldom reduced the debt by a substantial amount."' In
addition, the debtor would occasionally make two or three such payments a
month.259 Under such circumstances, should any payments to the creditor
within the preference period be protected by 547(c) (2)?
The first question is whether a payment under such a practice is objectively ordinary under 547(c) (2) (C). One's gut-level feeling is to say no; the entire
bill was to be paid during the month following the purchases and not doing so
simply takes it out of the "ordinary" category. However, many businesses
operate this way. In fact, most of the debtors of the creditor in Fergusonprobably had payment practices similar to this. The creditor is in effect extending a
continuing line of credit to the debtor. It is in his best interests to have credit
terms that require payment in the month following purchases. But he should
not be penalized for extending continuing credit when this is part of a practice
that has been long established between the parties. The real problem is to
determine if the parties' past practice had reasonable and ascertainable boundaries. If so, and the transfers in question fell within them, then it should be
protected. However, if past conduct was so random and haphazard that it
yields no reasonable, 26ascertainable boundaries, then the transfers should not be
considered ordinary. 0
The big problem with section 547(c) (2)(C) is determining what the benchmark for the objective standard should be. Business practices in general? Prac25

'However, the court should be careful in defining the boundaries of past conduct. Unusual dealings
brought upon by the possibility that the debtor may enter bankruptcy may occur before the 90 day
preference period begins. After all, the parties, especially the creditors, do not know exactly when the debtor
will enter bankruptcy. If unusual actions prior to the preference period are used to determine the parties' ordinary course of business, then the court may end up protecting payments that were not meant to be protected. See Ferguson. 41 Bankr. 118, where the court may have done just that. See supra note 172 and accompanying text which discuss this aspect of Ferguson.
11541 Bankr. 118. See supra notes 165-172 for a more complete discussion of this case.
2

'4id. at 221.
'Id. at 119, 221.
25
1d. at 119.
25 9

1d.

2'See supra paragraph of text accompanying note 254; cf. Triple A
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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tices in a particular industry?2 61 If so, which party's industry? And, how does
one define the industry? This could be a problem for the courts. In most cases,
however, general business practices should be the standard.
For the most part, 547(c) (2) (C) was put in to ensure that the parties'
course of dealing lived up to general business practices. It prevents a creditor
from arguing that it was in the parties' ordinary course of business for the debtor to make late payments, or to pay whenever he felt like it. After all, 547(c) (2)
is to protect normal business practices; Congress felt that there was no need to
protect "unorthodox" or "helter skelter" business transactions. 62 But if the parties' practice is within generally accepted business practices and is an established part of the parties' dealings, there should be no need to examine industry
standards.
There are several reasons for not generally requiring proof of the business
terms in a particular industry. As indicated above, just choosing and defining
the relevant industry would be a considerable task in many instances. Then,
once an industry was chosen, a large amount of proof would usually be required to show the industry standards. And in most cases, it would be found
that there is no one standard; the industry practices are varied and the parties'
conduct fell well within accepted norms. Most importantly, why should the
creditor be forced to prove that the parties' business terms conformed to the industries' when they have been doing business together for years, on terms
which are reasonable in light of general business practices?
In addition, most non-ordinary business terms that surface in the cases are
non-ordinary in a general business or practice sense. It is not normal for a debtor to make late payments, even if the creditor can establish that this was the
normal practice. Likewise, it is not an ordinary business practice for a creditor
to threaten to join an involuntary petition against the debtor or to call on a personal guarantee of the debtor's president if he is not given preference over
other creditors. No industry standard is necessary to show that these are not
ordinary business terms. 63
In some situations, however, industry standards will be relevant. If the
terms used appear unusual or were used only occasionally by the parties, then
it may be necessary to look at industry practices. In such a case, the court may
wish extra assurance that the transaction was "ordinary" and not an unusual
action being camouflaged as ordinary. A good example of this is In re Amex
2

The court in In re Production Steel. Inc., BANKR. L. REP (CCH) 1 70,843, required this.
b'E.g.. In re Independent Clearinghouse, Inc.. 41 Bankr. 985 (Ponzi scheme): In re Triple A Coal, Inc.. 41
Bankr. 541 (involved poor, haphazard recordkeeping and substantial insider wheeling and dealing, that
bordered on fraud). In such case, there is no need to rely on an industry standard to determine that §
547(c)(2) does not apply.
'But it would be wise to have the creditor testify that the transaction was in accord with industry standard
if, in fact, it was. See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.
2
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Trading Co.264 where the parties normally paid debts with cash, but the
transfer in question was a payment of goods (a barge of chemicals). Both parties were chemical brokers and the creditor put on evidence that they had settled debts in this manner in the past. In addition, the creditor introduced
evidence that such a transaction was a standard practice among chemical
brokers. The court held that the transfer was protected by 547(c) (2). But
without the industry evidence, it could have concluded that the taking of
goods in payment of a debt when cash was usually used was nothing but an attempt to obtain preference over other creditors.
Another situation where an industry standard will be important is when
the parties have not previously done business together. In such a case, the parties' normal business practices with other creditors and debtors, as well as industry standards, will be relevant to proving 547(c) (2) (B) and 547(c) (2) (C).265
However, when the parties have a history of dealing together, then that should
be the primary focus, with the ordinary business terms requirement only striking down transfers that are contrary to general business practices (e.g., late
payments).
Obviously, section 547(c) (2) leaves a lot of discretion to the bankruptcy
court. It must determine that the underlying debt is "ordinary" and the
transfer conforms to general business practices. Then it must determine the
boundaries of the parties' past dealings and see if the transaction at hand falls
within the boundaries. But this does not imply inconsistent decisions. For the
most part, the cases thus far have been consistent in result, though not in approach. And as more cases are decided, a consistent framework of analysis will
develop, hopefully encompassing the suggestions outlined above. At this point
in time, it would not be helpful to examine the almost infinite variety of
hypothetical situations that could arise, given the fact-specific nature of 547(c)
(2)
cases. However, two issues that need to be addressed are: (1)Does 547(c) (2)
now cover principal payments on long-term debts? (2) Should a transfer receive
547(c) (2) protection when most, if not all, other creditor's are not paid during
the period preceding bankruptcy?
ARE PAYMENTS ON LONG-TERM DEBT PROTECTED?

One of the biggest questions arising from the 1984 amendments is
whether section 547(c) (2) now applies to payments made on long-term debt.
The 45 day rule necessarily limited it to payments on short-term debt. With
that requirement gone, however, the statute on its face applies to payments on
all debt, both long-term and short-term. Some commentators have stated that
it should still be applied only to payments on short-term debt." However, the
1"37 Bankr. 793 Idiscussed supra at notes 184-189 and accompanying text).
".'See Nutovic, supra note 10, at 184.
'"Duncan. Loan Payments to Secured Creditors as Preferences Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/5
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legislative history contains no express statement which limits 547(c) (2) to
short-term debt, and applying it to payments on all debt is more consistent
with the policies behind the section. Thus, the more reasoned view is that it
should apply to payments on both long-term and short-term debt."'
As mentioned, the legislative history behind the 1984 amendment to
547(c) (2) is practically non-existent, and thus, is no real help in determining
whether Congress meant to protect payments on long-term debt.2 Therefore,
an examination of whether protection of such payments supports the policies
behind 547(c) (2) is in order. 69
First of all, avoidance of timely payments of long-term debt definitely interferes with "normal financial relations." To the extent that such payments
are avoided as preferences, normal financial relations suffer. Moreover, how
do you define short term? Six months, one year, two years? The line between
short term and long-term is at best fuzzy. It will no doubt take years for the
courts to consistently define short-term and when they do the decision will be
little more than arbitrary judicial line drawing. In the meantime, the inconsistency and confusion created will definitely not preserve financial relations.
What about the policy to encourage creditors to deal with troubled debtors? One could argue that long-term creditors do not need encouragement to
deal with debtors. Most long-term debtors are already locked in and few, if
any, would even give long-term credit to a debtor who appears to be on the
verge of bankruptcy. This is true. But what about a creditor who is considering
giving long-term credit to a debtor who is having problems, but not on the
brink of bankruptcy?
One argument is that such creditors can, and usually do, secure their
loans and, thus, do not have to worry about preference laws. 70 However, this
is not always possible. In addition, many secured creditors find themselves undersecured when the debtor enters bankruptcy and payments on undersecured
debt within the preference period are avoidable. Another argument is that a
long-term installment creditor will only have to return three payments as
preferences, which is only a small percentage of the total payments that are
necessary to retire such a debt. Granted, this possibility is probably not enough
to prevent most creditors from giving a loan. It merely increases the creditor's
"iSee.e.g.. Nutovic, supra note 10, at 186 n.53; Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 23, at 264. Both articles
express the opinion that § 547(c)(2) now applies to long-term debt. One even called the 1984 amendments a
"welcome relief to lenders and other credit grantors." Id.
'"See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
2
'Remember, the primary policy of bankruptcy law is equality of distribution of the debtor's assets among
his creditors. Preference law ensures that pre-bankruptcy transfers that interfere with this are avoided. Congress determined that ordinary course of business transfers do not interfere with the equality of distribution,
and that protecting them supported other important policies of preserving normal financial relations and encouraging creditors to extend credit to troubled debtors. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
"'Payments on fully secured loans are not preferences. See supra note 2 1.
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risk and, thus, the cost of credit to the debtor. But should bankruptcy
preference laws be interpreted so as to raise the cost of obtaining credit?
The big problem is not that long-term creditors will not deal with debtors
who appear to be on the verge of bankruptcy, but that they may pull the rug
out from under one debtor when financial problems arise. An undersecured,
long-term creditor who discovers that his debtor is having serious financial
troubles may find it to his advantage to foreclose, if the chance to do so arises.
Most collateral decreases in value over time, both from wear and tear and from
the fact that it just gets older. If he is not being paid (or the payments are subject to avoidance when the debtor enters bankruptcy), it may be best for him to
foreclose and limit his loss on the transaction. However, if he can be assured of
keeping timely payments and the payments at least equal the amount by which
the collateral is decreasing in value, then there is no incentive to foreclose. 7'
Hopefully, the debtor will recover and, if not, the creditor is in no worse a position than if he had foreclosed at the first sign of financial trouble. 2"
It could also be argued that a policy of preference law is to maximize the
estate and, while payment on short-term debt does not diminish the estate
because there is an offsetting contribution to the estate, payment on a longterm debt diminishes the estate because it offers no offsetting contribution."'
On the surface, this argument has merit; however, on closer examination it, for
the most part, fails. First, maximizing the estate was never explicitly stated by
Congress as a policy supporting preference law. At best, its a secondary policy.
The debtor's estate is to be frozen and maximized from the date the petition
was filed."' Preference law merely brings in pre-petition transfers that interfere
with the goal of equal distribution. Congress has stated that ordinary course of
business payments do not interfere with this goal. Second, contrary to what
some courts and commentators have stated, Congress never stated that a
justification for 547(c) (2) was that such payments involved an offsetting contribution to the estate. The policy underlying 547(c) (2) is to preserve normal
financial relations. It is true that goods purchased with short-term credit shortly before bankruptcy are likely to still be in the estate. But so is a piece of
machinery that was purchased on credit five years ago. Whether either debt is
paid, the items remain in the estate. It is also true that short-term creditors may
be more vital to a troubled debtor, and thus, they need an incentive to extend
credit. But why deny the long-term creditor payments which were timely made
27

Cf Morris, 53 Bankr. at 193.
' He isin no worse a position because the timely payments hopefully at least equal the amount by which the
collateral is decreasing in value. If this happens then his secured position is not deteriorating. Moreover, if
the payments exceed the amount by which the collateral is decreasing in value, the creditor is improving his
secured position. This is because any payments to an undersecured are credited to the unsecured portion of
his loan.
"'This was the main argument used by one commentator who argued that payment on long-term obligations
should not be protected. See Duncan, supra note 266, at 90.
27
1Nutovic, supra note 10, at 186.
22
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in the ordinary course of business?
Policy arguments aside, what did Congress intend? Well, the 45 day requirement was the only part of the statute that limited its effect to short-term
payments and it was removed in 1984. One commentator has argued that a
short statement in the legislative history of the 1984 Act, ensuring a Senator
that the amendment would relieve the problems that the 45 day requirement
caused in the commercial paper market 7 ' indicates that Congress meant for
section 547(c) (2)to still apply only to short-term debt. Congress was concerned
about that problem and all the other problems caused by the 45 day requirement. 76 But that statement does not even intimate that 547(c) (2)was to be
limited to short term transactions. Moreover, in 1980 the Senate considered,
but rejected, a bill that would have provided a specific exception to preference
treatment for transactions in the commercial paper market.
In short, there were several options Congress could have chosen to
eliminate some of the problems the 45 day rule caused without extending protection to long-term debt. But, it did not choose these options. It could have
removed the 45 day rule and inserted "short-term" in 547(c) (2). Or it could
have changed the 45 day rule to, say, 90 or 100 days. Or, as mentioned above,
it could have created a specific exception for commercial paper. But Congress
instead simply eliminated the 45 day rule. By doing so, it removed the only element that limited 547(c) (2) to short term transactions. Its choice is clear payments on all types of debt, both long- and short-term, can be protected.
Right or wrong, it made a choice and it is not for the courts to alter it. If Congress decides that it made a wrong choice, that 547(c) (2)takes away too much
of the bite from preference law, it is Congress' responsibility to change it. 78
Is A PAYMENT To ONE CREDITOR "ORDINARY" WHEN
MOST OR ALL OTHERS ARE NOT PAID?

Another problem which is sure to come up in future cases is whether a
timely and otherwise ordinary payment to one creditor is protected by 547(c)
(2) when most of the debtor's other creditors are not being paid. Intuitively, it
seems that such transfers should not be considered to have been made in the
ordinary course of business of the debtor or according to ordinary business
"'Duncan, supra note 266, at 90 n.28. See supra note 150 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
scant legislative history of the 1984 amendment.
"'See supra notes 120-145 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems caused by the 45 day rule.
"'See supra note ISO.
'A remark made by the Eighth Circuit in holding that old § 547(c)(2) applied to interest payments on longterm installment debt is particularly relevant:
We are not suggesting that there are not countervailing policy donsiderations. When dealing with
reorganization, one creditor's gain is usually another's loss. Congress could decide that banks are less
in need of protection than other creditors and legislate accordingly. But a court should not make such
a decision absent evidence of a congressional intent to do so, especially when the plain language and
usual meaning of the words are clear.
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terms. However, very few debtors can pay all their creditors in the months
preceding bankruptcy. When liquid assets are less than liabilities, it is
necessary for the debtor to choose which bills must be kept current in order to
stay in business. And, since preventing bankruptcy in the first place is an important goal, and since section 547(c) (2) in particular is directed at preserving
normal financial relations, the courts should be hesitant in denying a creditor
such a payment if it was made in good faith and was otherwise "ordinary."
Nonetheless, it seems unfair and against the policy of equal distribution to
allow payments to some creditors while others go unpaid. But, courts have
been particularly unresponsive to claims of unfairness in preference cases. And
the policy of equal distribution is relative; exact equality is never achieved.279 In
fact, in every case where 547(c) (2)is applied, some other creditors are not paid
in full. If all creditors were being paid, then there would be no need for
bankruptcy in the first place.
But what about cases where only one or two creditors are paid in the 90
days prior to bankruptcy while the other 10, 20, 30 or 100 creditors are not?
When this occurs, the court should be more reluctant in applying section
547(c) (2). Paying two out of 100 creditors is seldom going to do much to keep
the debtor in business. It is more indicative of creditor pressure or "bad"
motive on the part of the debtor in deciding who to pay. 8 0 The creditor
pressure can be explicit like threatening to join an involuntary petition or to
call on a personal guarantee. Likewise, it can be implicit; just the fact that the
or sole shareholder
creditor has a personal guarantee of the debtor's president
2"' The debtor's "bad"
others.
over
paid
be
to
him
cause
covering the debt could
motive could be in paying debts owed to insiders, relatives, friends or pressure
creditors while ignoring all other creditors. Where one or more of these factors
are present in a case where the debtor paid only a small percentage of his
creditors during the preference period, the court should deny section 547(c) (2)
protection. Such payments should not be considered ordinary282 unless it can be
shown that the debtor made a necessary and good faith business decision to
pay these few over others.
In such a situation, who should have the burden of showing improper
"'The Bankruptcy Code itself does not even provide for complete equality (e.g., administrative expenses
where priority creditors are paid before general creditors).
110"Bad" motive is not meant to imply evil or illegal actions, just the type of motive that takes a transfer cut
of § 547(c)(2) protection (like only paying your brother-in-law). Note that the debtor and creditor's motive,
knowledge, intent, etc., while no longer preference elements, are relevant to a § 547(c)(2) determination. See
supra note 237.
2
'Another example of implicit pressure is where the president or shareholder of a debtor corporation also
does business with the creditor in his personal capacity and wants to continue to do so after the corporation's
bankruptcy.
2Remember that this section is assuming that the transfer in question is ordinary in all other respects. Bad
motive and creditor pressure, both implicit and explicit, should be considered if there are other out-of-theordinary aspects of the transaction.
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pressure or motive? The creditor has the burden of proving whether 547(c) (2)
applies to the transfer, 8 3 so it might seem proper to make him prove that no
such pressure or motive existed. However, this would require the creditor to
prove a negative, which is not an easy task. Such a rule would hurt honest,
good faith creditors as much as "bad" ones.
A better rule would be for the trustee to have the burden of coming forward with evidence showing pressure or bad motives in cases where very few
creditors were being paid. The trustee should also have to put on some
evidence that paying the particular creditor was not vital to keeping the
business going. The ultimate burden of proof would still be on the creditor and
if such a showing was made he would have to bring in evidence proving that
the debtor made a rational, good faith decision to pay him over other creditors.
This method would place the initial burden on the person who normally has
the best access to the records and the best knowledge of the debtor's operations: the trustee or the debtor-in-possession.
One caveat of this should be that when the creditor is an insider or other
person with a close relationship with the debtor, he should have to justify why
he was paid over others, without a showing of bad motive or pressure by the
trustee. All that the trustee would have to show is that only a small percentage
of the debtor's creditors were being paid and that this creditor was an insider.
In such a case, unlike with unrelated creditors, the debtor is less likely to
cooperate with the trustee in showing pressure, etc. Moreover, an insider is
likely to have specific knowledge of the debtor's business and should easily be
able to prove why he was paid over other creditors.
It should be stressed that in most cases the debtor's good faith decision on
who to pay should be respected. Creditor pressure and bad debtor or creditor
motive should only be relevant when relatively few creditors were paid or
when other out-of-the-ordinary aspects of a transaction are present.
CONCLUSION

It was no doubt hoped that the 1984 amendment would eliminate all of
the problems surrounding section 547(c) (2). Unfortunately, the amendment
has just substituted one set of problems for another. Removing the 45 day requirement was a positive step. But, Congress's total lack of guidance as to the
meaning of the now-crucial ordinary course requirements leaves the exception
in as confused a state as it was before the amendment. It will take years of
litigation before the courts clearly establish the boundaries of the exception.
Hopefully, in doing so, they will follow and expand upon the few decisions to
date that have examined the ordinary course requirements while providing a
consistent and structured framework to guide future decision makers. But, un28311 U.S.C.

§ 547(g).
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til this occurs, section 547(c) (2) will continue to evade its stated purpose of
"preserving normal financial relations."
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